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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, banking regulators from the major
industrialized nations have placed an emphasis on risk-based
capital requirements as a primary means of ensuring a safe
and sound banking system. Although economists have found
no statistical correlation between bank capital levels and bank
failures, it is difficult to argue with the proposition that higher
capital requirements both increase a bank's stability and lower
the expected cost of bank failures.' Capital requirements
which reflect the riskiness of a bank's assets and activities
provide assurances to depositors and enable banks to incur
unanticipated losses with enough margin to continue as a
going concern. Additionally, mandatory capital requirements
subject these institutions to greater market discipline and
counteract the moral hazard implicit in a system marked by
deposit insurance.2
The capital required to be held by many of the world's most
prominent banks is strongly influenced by an international
agreement known as the Basle Accord ("Basle" or "the
accord").' By establishing uniform risk-based capital
* Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, N.Y.; J.D. 1994,
Harvard Law School; B.S., B.A. 1991 University of Pennsylvania. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Hal Scott,
Professor Howell Jackson and Daniel P. Cunningham.
' Ethan B. Kapstein, Supervising International Banks: Origins and
Implications of the Basle Accord, in 1 GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL
REGULATIONS 3, 27 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994).
' When a bank's capital has been impaired, there are incentives to
engage in risky projects because all gains accrue to the equity holders, while
most losses will be borne by the deposit insurer. Capital acts as a deductible
in this insurance policy, and higher deductibles counteract such incentives.
See George J. Benston, The Purpose of Capital for Institutions with
Government-Insured Deposits, in 1 GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL
REGULATIONS 342, 353-54 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994).
' See Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices:
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards
(259)
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guidelines, this landmark agreement seeks to promote the
convergence of capital requirements for internationally active
banks. While fashioning an agreement to accomplish this goal
is no small task, it was clear from the beginning that
establishing capital requirements for off-balance-sheet items,
such as derivative instruments, would pose unique problems.
Although the proliferation of derivative financial products
over the last several decades has redefined the way in which
risks are controlled and has revolutionized the development
and efficiency of the global capital markets, their increased
usage by many of the world's banks and securities firms has
been a cause of concern for the regulators of these institutions.
Since derivatives are novel, complex, and opaque, they appear
risky. Some believe that derivatives could be the cause of the
next banking crisis.4 In spite of this, banks continue to shift
away from traditional deposit taking and lending and now
derive substantial revenue and profit from derivatives.
Therefore, the importance of designing proper risk-based
capital requirements for these activities has never been more
apparent.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the risks which
banks face with respect to swaps, one of the most important
types of derivative instruments, and to determine whether
Basle's risk-based capital requirements accurately reflect swap
risks. Market participants believe that the capital now
required to support swap activities is too high and, in light of
increased competition and declining spreads in the swap
market, fear that such requirements will hinder their
profitability and drive them from the swap marketplace.'
Many regulators, however, believe the contrary. Whether or
not swaps are properly capitalized relative to their risks is a
difficult issue which is vital to the health of individual banks
across the globe, as well as to the global financial system.'
(July 1988), reprinted in 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 143 (July 25, 1988)
[hereinafter BIS Accord].
4 See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102
YALE L.J. 1457, 1459-60 (1993).
' See Kerry Tremble & Arun Sarwa, Happiness Is a Full Net,
EUROMONEY, Apr. 1991, at 34, 34.
6 This does not dispute the fact that other measures and regulations
aside from capital requirements, which are not the focus of this Article, play
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This Article is divided into four main parts. Following the
introduction, Section 2 briefly explains the structure and
general provisions of the Basle Accord. Section 3 discusses the
role of financial intermediaries in the swap market, and then
examines the major risks inherent in swap activities, most
notably credit risk and market risk. Section 4 discusses the
treatment of swaps under the Basle Accord, as well as under
recently enacted and proposed amendments, and analyzes
whether the accord's provisions accurately reflect swap credit
and market risks. Section 5 discusses the consequences of
imposing capital requirements which do not reflect swap risks
and sets forth several recommendations to prevent these
consequences.
2. BANKS AND CAPITAL: THE BASLE ACCORD
The Basle Accord, a product of the Basle Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, operates
under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements
("BIS") and is composed of representatives from the Group of
Ten countries and Luxembourg.7 Established in 1975, the
committee's twin objectives are to strengthen the safety and
soundness of the international banking system and to remove
competitive inequalities resulting from the imposition of
divergent capital requirements by regulatory authorities in
different countries.' The initial accord, signed on July 15,
1988, provides a common basis for defining the elements of
capital, relating capital to banking risks, and establishing
an important role in bank safety.
' The Group of Ten ("G-10") countries include Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
" See BIS Accord, supra note 3, at 143. Although national regulators in
each country have an interest in the maintenance of a healthy international
financial system, they may have an even stronger interest in enhancing the
competitiveness of their own nation's banks by minimizing regulatory costs,
perhaps resulting in overly lenient regulation. Many think that
international coordination is needed to prevent this kind of "race to the
bottom." See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 333, 371-72 (1989). Higher leverage translates into a lower cost of
funds for banks and may result in competitive advantages.
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minimum risk-based capital requirements.9 Effective January
1, 1993, it requires that "international banks" maintain a
minimum level of capital equal to 8% of "risk-adjusted assets."
The measure of risk-adjusted assets is computed by
assigning one of five different risk weights to the book value
of each bank asset, depending on the perceived credit risk of
the obligor. The five weight categories are: 0, 10, 20, 50 and
100%.'o Guidelines developed by Basle specify the risk
weight to be assigned to different categories of assets. For
example, assets in the 0% category, meaning that no capital
must be held against these assets, include cash, balances at
and claims on the domestic central bank, and loans to domestic
central governments. 1 Assets weighted at 20% include
claims on foreign banks with an original maturity of less than
one year, claims on domestic banks, and loans guaranteed by
domestic banks.'2 Assets weighted at 50% include mortgage
loans.'3 All other assets, such as commercial loans to private
parties, are generally assigned a 100% risk weight, meaning
that capital equal to 8% of the asset must be held.'4 Off-
balance-sheet activities, such as swaps and other derivatives,
are incorporated into this framework by first converting them
into "credit equivalents" reflecting the credit exposure of the
activity, and then multiplying them by risk weights.'5 The
total risk-adjusted net asset figure is calculated by adding the
products of each asset multiplied by its appropriate risk
weight. Under Basle, a bank must hold 8% of this figure as
credit risk-based capital.' 6
'See Paul S. Pilecki et al., BANKING LAW §216-21 (1994).
10 See BIS Accord, supra note 3, at 147.
1 Other assets may also be placed in the 0% risk category at the.-
discretion of national regulators. See id. at 152.
12 See id.
• See id. at 153.
14 See id.
" For a complete description of Basle's treatment of swaps, see infra
Section 4.1.1.
1 However, capital is given a rather expansive meaning and is
subdivided into two tiers. Half of the required capital must be in the form
of tier one or core capital, which includes tangible shareholders' equity
(excluding goodwill) and disclosed reserves. The remainder may be in the
form of tier two or supplementary capital, which includes loan-loss reserves,
certain unrealized gains on marketable securities, certain subordinated
debt, and certain hybrid debt instruments. See BIS Accord, supra note 3,
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Although the accord applies to internationally active banks
operating in the G-10 countries and Luxembourg, it is not self-
executing. Therefore, the accord is not legally binding unless
each country passes the appropriate laws or adopts the
appropriate rules implementing its specific provisions. Since
the purpose of the accord is to establish "minimum" capital
requirements, national regulators are free to impose more
stringent provisions. In addition, there are many areas of the
accord which grant discretion to national regulators. For
example, national regulators have wide latitude in
determining which financial institutions will be subject to the
accord's provisions. 7 In actuality, most of the Basle
signatory countries have adopted the provisions, and many
other jurisdictions observe the requirements as well.'"
Many have criticized the original 1988 accord. It has been
argued that the risk categories are very broad, and therefore
the characteristics of the obligor are not taken into account
except at a crude level.' In addition, it is claimed that the
risk weights chosen have little or no empirical content.2"
Furthermore, Basle assumes that credit risks are additive,
ignoring the teachings of modern portfolio theory and the
benefits of diversification.2'
at 144-46.
17 The accord merely states that it applies to "international banks" with
no attempt at defining the term. See id. at 143.
18 See Maximilian J.B. Hall, The Measurement and Assessment of Capital
Adequacy for Banks: A Critique of the G-1O Agreement, in 1 GLOBAL RISK
BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 270, 270 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds.,
1994).
', For example, in spite of the fact that the risk profile of individual
borrowers varies tremendously, all commercial loans are weighted 100%.
If the riskiness of the assets within risk categories varies, banks can easily
alter the amount of risk without changing the amount of capital required.
See Eric Hirschhorn, Interactions Between Risk Based CapitalRequirements,
Risk Based Deposit Insurance Premiums, and Bank Risk, in 1 GLOBAL RISK
BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 528, 530 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds.,
1994).
20 See Edward L. Golding & Robert Van Order, A Critique of Risk Based
Capital Guidelines, in 1 GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 477, 481
(Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994). The weights are further
distorted by the use of book values, which are measured at historical cost,
rather than current market values. See id.
21 See id. at 482. Another criticism is that subordinated debt is relegated
to secondary importance, yet in many ways is preferable to equity because
debtholders are not affected by the moral hazard created by deposit
19951
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Perhaps the main criticism of the accord is that its
requirements are designed solely to guard against credit risks,
even though most assets contain other substantial risks, such
as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, and other types of
market risks. The 1988 accord, however, does not take these
risks into account, nor does it consider how all these risks
interact. For example, although government debt may have no
default risk, it has a considerable amount of interest rate
risk.22 "[Ilt is not difficult to argue that the introduction of
[risk-based capital requirements] in their present form is, at
best, a half-finished job and, at worst, a regulatory measure
whose undesirable side effects may be more far-reaching than
originally expected." 3
In light of these criticisms, the Basle Committee released
for comment several reform proposals in April 1993. One
proposal, which was adopted pursuant to amendments to the
accord in July 1994 and April 1995, relates to the use of
bilateral netting for determining credit risk for certain
derivatives. A second proposal, which did not envision a
separate capital charge, sets forth a common approach for
measuring interest rate risk in order to identify those
institutions that are extremely vulnerable to changes in
interest rates. The third proposal, which was revised in April
1995, is to incorporate minimum capital requirements for
insurance. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Douglas D. Evanoff,
Capital Requirements and Bank Regulatory Reform, in 1 GLOBAL RISK
BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 511, 514 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds.,
1994). As pointed out by Scott and Iwahara, Basle's attempts to create a
level playing field may be unsuccessful because of differences in national
capital market development, tax and accounting rules, and other banking
regulations such as the extent of deposit insurance and other safety nets.
See HAL S. SCOTT & SHINSAKU IWAHARA, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD IN JAPAN AND
THE UNITED STATES, (Group of Thirty 1994). For other criticisms of Basle's
provisions, see generally Hall, supra note 18 (finding fault with the risk
assessment techniques adopted by Basle).
12 A one percentage point change in interest rates could cause
approximately a 10-20% change in the value of a thirty-year treasury bond.
Yet, government treasuries do not generally require any bank capital. See
Golding & Van Order, supra note 20, at 482.
23 Pier Luigi Gilibert, Promoting Regulatory Convergence:A Comparative
Assessment of European Bank Capital Regulation, in 1 GLOBAL RISK BASED
CAPITAL REGULATIONS 196, 205 (Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994).
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market risks.24 Before discussing and critiquing Basle's
treatment of swaps, the next section will provide an
explanation of the swap risks that banks face.
3. SwAPs AND BANKS: ROLES AND RISKS
3.1. A Brief Introduction to Swaps
A swap belongs to a class of financial instruments known
as derivatives. In contrast to a stock or a bond which
represents financial claims with intrinsic value, a derivative
instrument is a financial contract which derives its value from
an underlying asset, reference rate, or index. 5 The most
common derivative instruments are options, forwards, futures,
and swaps.
Derivatives are extremely important because they facilitate
the ability to transfer and accept risks, enabling entities to
hedge against fluctuations in profits which may be caused by
changes in exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices, or
equity prices. Complex risks that are bound together in
traditional instruments can be teased apart and managed
more effectively and inexpensively because transaction costs
in the derivatives markets are very low."6 Efficiency gains
are created when risks are shifted to those best able to bear
them. In the last 20 years, prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates have been extremely volatile, and derivatives
have made it possible to hedge against the risks which
accompany such volatility." Swaps have played an integral
role in this market development.
24 These proposals and amendments are discussed infra Section 4.
2 A share of stock, for example, is valuable because it entitled the holder
to dividend payments and to a percentage of the firm's net assets upon
dissolution. A stock option (which entitles the holder to buy or sell shares
of stock at a predetermined price prior to a certain expiration date),
however, derives its value from the price of the underlying stock on which
the option is written.
2 6 See GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, THE GROUP OF THIRTY,
DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPALS 2 (1993), [hereinafter G-30
REPORT]. In addition, such markets are often more liquid than the markets
for the underlying assets, and therefore the prices tend to be more efficient.
See id, at 46.
" See You'd Better Ask Murphy, THE BANKER, Feb. 1993, at 48.
1995]
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A swap is a contract whereby two counterparties agree to
exchange future cash flows at periodic intervals during the life
of the swap according to a prearranged formula.2' These cash
flows are determined by applying the prearranged formula to
the "notional" principal amount of the swap. In most swaps,
such as interest rate swaps, this notional amount never
changes hands and is merely used as a reference for
calculating the future cash flows. In other swaps, including
most currency swaps, this notional amount will be exchanged
at the inception and at the completion of the swap. Consider
the following paradigm.
3.1.1. Swap Paradigm: The 'Plain Vanilla" Interest Rate
Swap
Company A and company B enter into a five-year fixed-
floating interest rate swap on a $100,000 notional amount. A
thereby agrees to pay B a fixed interest rate of 8%
semiannually, in exchange for B's promise to pay A
semiannual floating-rate interest equal to the six-month
LIBOR rate (see Figure 1)." Both interest payments are
based on the $100,000 notional amount. The swap rates
agreed upon by these counterparties typically will be set such
that the value of the swap to either party at inception is zero.
In other words, the present value of the fixed-rate payment
stream promised by company A is equal to the expected present
value of the floating-rate payment stream promised by
28 The maturity of the swap is known as the tenor.
29 In this swap, A is referred to as the fixed-rate payer, and B is referred
to as the floating-rate payer. Although the floating rate of a swap can be
based on any floating rate available in the market, it is most often based on
the London Interbank Offer Rate (OLIBOR"), which is the rate of interest
offered by London banks on deposits from other banks. One month LIBOR
is the rate offered on one-month deposits, six-month LIBOR is the rate
offered on six-month deposits, etc. LIBOR is a frequently used reference
rate for loans in the international financial markets. JOHN HULL,
INTRODUCTION TO FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 141 (1991).
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company B.30 Therefore, there is generally no exchange of
payments when the contract is formed.3
Figure 1: Anatomy of a Swap.
The Swap Semiannual Swap Payments
[I] 8% fixed (8%+2)x$100000=$4,00O
LBOR I I A (LIBOR-+.2) x$100,000=?IB
At the end of each six-month period, A will pay B $4,000,
and B will pay A the product of the LIBOR rate which existed
at the beginning of the current interest period times the
notional amount.3 2 Assume that the end of the first interest
period is approaching, and that LIBOR was 7% at the
inception of the swap. 3 Company A will pay B $4,000, and
B will pay A $3,500. In practice, a net payment from A to B
in the amount of $500 would be made. These net payments
SO Since swaps essentially involve the buying and selling of cash flows,
they can be valued using a standard discounted cash flow analysis. Strictly
speaking, the value of a swap to a financial intermediary will be slightly
positive when first negotiated because of the bid-ask spread. Id. at 148 n.
5. See infra note 59.
" The swap rates [also referred to herein as "underlying swap rates,"
"underlying rates," or "underlying reference rates"] are structured by the
market such that the fixed and floating rates at inception are market
equivalents. This is known as a "par swap." In a non-par swap, the rates
are structured such that the swap has a positive value to one party and a
negative value to the other at inception, and, therefore, the party with
negative value will require an up front premium equal to this amount.
3" The floating rate is generally "pegged" at the beginning of each
interest period, and "reset" at the end of every interest period. Therefore,
the LIBOR rate at inception will be used to calculate the first swap payment
by the floating-rate payer. The LIBOR rate in effect at the end of six
months will be used to calculate the floating payment at the end of year one,
and so forth.
" It may appear contradictory to say that the swap has zero value at
inception when the fixed rate is initially higher than the floating rate,
resulting in a net payment by the fixed-rate payer to the floating-rate payer
at the end of the first interest period. This is because the value of the swap
is the present value of the expected net future cash flows over the life of the
swap. If the fixed long-term rate is higher than the short-term floating rate,
the swap counterparties "believe" that short-term rates will rise in the
future. Consider the analogy of obtaining a mortgage, in which the bank
offers the option of an adjustable rate or a higher fixed rate.
1995]
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will vary as LIBOR changes, and will continue every six
months for the life of the swap. Note that the notional amount
used to compute each semiannual swap payment never
changes hands, but is simply used as a basis for calculating
the interest payments between the parties.34
This simple interest rate swap is a very powerful tool
which allows the counterparties to alter the character of their
assets and liabilities, fine tune their risk exposure, lower their
cost of capital, or speculate on interest rate changes. For
example, if A had floating-rate debt previously outstanding,
and was concerned about rising interest rates, the transaction
above would allow it to swap itself out of a floating rate and
into a fixed rate.35 Alternatively, if A's business profits were
negatively correlated with interest rates, it could utilize the
swap above to hedge this risk exposure.3" In addition, this
swap could be used to lower borrowing costs by capitalizing on
market imperfections." Swaps are particularly important to
companies with a poor credit rating, because such companies
generally are unable to borrow from banks at a fixed rate.
Swaps enable these companies to simulate fixed-rate
borrowing.3"
4 A reason that this notional principal never changes hands is that this
swap is equivalent to parallel loans, a transaction in which B borrows from
A at a floating rate and simultaneously makes a fixed-rate loan to A for the
same principal amount. Since the principal amount of these "loans" is the
same, there is no point in exchanging exactly offsetting cash flows at the
inception and completion of the swap. HULL, supra note 29, at 145.
" In practice, A would use the floating-rate swap payments from B to
service the required payment on the floating-rate debt, in effect converting
floating-rate debt into a fixed-rate swap obligation.
36 When interest rates rise, profits from the swap contract would offset
the business operating losses.
"' The capital markets may not be equally receptive to fixed-rate and
floating-rate debt by the same issuer, perhaps resulting in a situation where
A has a comparative advantage in the floating-rate capital markets relative
to B, while B has a corresponding comparative advantage in the fixed-rate
debt market (or vice versa). Therefore, analogous to the concepts that
underlie international trade theory, gains can be captured by both parties
if each issues capital in the market in which it has a comparative advantage
and then "trades" by executing a swap contract. These "arbitrage"
opportunities often exist as a result of regulatory or tax differences among
various countries.
38 SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON & JOHN A.M. PRICE, CURRENCY AND
INTEREST RATE SWAPS vii (1984).
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3.1.2. Other Types of Swaps
Almost any kind of swap can be created. Interest rate and
currency swaps are the most common, and comprise over 90%
of all swap transactions (as a percentage of notional principal
amount). However, the use of commodity and equity swaps
continues to grow at a rapid rate.
In a standard currency swap, one counterparty agrees to
make fixed interest payments in one currency according to a
prearranged formula calculated on a specific notional amount,
and the other counterparty agrees to make fixed interest
payments in another currency based on a different, yet
equivalent, notional amount. In a currency swap, the notional
principal must be specified in each of the two currencies, such
that these amounts are approximately equal given the
exchange rate at the inception of the swap.39 Unlike an
interest rate swap, a currency swap usually involves the
exchange of these notional principal amounts at the inception
and maturity of the swap in addition to the exchange of
interest payments.4" Currency swaps, similar to interest rate
swaps, can be used to alter asset and liability characteristics,
hedge currency exposure, 41  arbitrage market
imperfections,4 2 or speculate on currency fluctuations.
A less common type of swap is an equity swap, in which the
swap payments are determined according to the future
performance of certain equity products. For example, one
party could swap payments of the appreciation in the S&P 500
"' See HULL, supra note 29, at 152.
40 See id. at 145 and note 34 and accompanying text. Since the principal
amounts of these "parallel loans" are specified in two different currencies,
they will not be equivalent at the completion of the swap if exchange rates
change. See id. at 151.
41 For example, if an American company expects future revenues from a
foreign subsidiary and wants to avoid the risk of fluctuating exchange rates,
it could use a currency swap to hedge this exposure.
42 A currency swap can be used to lower borrowing costs by exploiting
international capital market imperfections. For example, an American
company's debt may command a premium if issued in a foreign country such
as Japan due to regulatory or other reasons. The company can issue yen
denominated bonds in Japan and then enter into a currency swap whereby
it receives yen and pays dollars to the swap counterparty. In the end, the
company has a dollar denominated liability at a lower economic cost than
it would have had if it issued fixed-rate debt in the U.S. See G-30 REPORT,
supra note 26, at 35. See also supra note 37.
1995]
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stock index for fixed interest rate payments. An equity swap
may be particularly advantageous if there are significant costs
associated with entering and exiting a foreign stock market.43
Similarly, a commodity swap links payment to the value of
certain underlying commodities. Firms that use commodities
as inputs can utilize such swaps to hedge the risk that the
prices of these inputs will fluctuate."
Within these broad categories, infinite variations can be
created. For example, the fixed-floating interest rate swap
demonstrated in Figure 1 can also be structured as an
exchange of two floating-rate payments, each based on a
different reference rate.45 The possibilities are limited only by
imagination and the availability of a willing counterparty.
Careful specification of the nature, timing, and amount of the
swap can insulate the end-user from an adverse movement in
interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, stock prices
or other variables on a long-term basis by changing the
characteristics of assets and liabilities in ways that were
previously believed "inconceivable."' Like other derivatives,
swaps allow for efficient tailoring of risk preferences through
asset and liability management, reduce borrowing costs, and
promote efficiency among the markets as a whole. They also
allow entities to arbitrage subtle economic, regulatory, or tax
differences across various capital markets.4"
3.1.3. Size and Growth of the Swap-Market
Since the first major swap in 1981,48 the market has
" For more information on equity swaps, see William D. Falloon, How
Appetites Are Growing for OTC Equity Derivatives, FUTURES, Jan. 1992, at
26; Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Dec. 1991, at 113.
44 For example, numerous U.S. municipal governments, whose
expenditures are subject to an annual budget, use oil swaps in order to lock
in or cap fuel costs. See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.
4r This is known as a basis swap. See HULL, supra note 29, at 156; see
also Robert H. Litzenberger, Swaps: Plain and Fanciful, J. FIN., July 1992
(describing other swaps variations).
46 See Hu, supra note 8, at 346.
47 See id. at 350.
48 Although the date of the first swap is disputed, the first large scale,
widely publicized swap was a currency swap between IBM and the World
Bank. Others, however, point to a 1976 transaction between Royal Bos
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grown dramatically from a notional amount of $865 billion
interest rate and currency swaps outstanding in 1987 to
approximately $7.1 trillion in 1993.4' Interest rate swaps
comprised about 87% of this total in 1993.50 Hundreds of
billions of dollars in new contracts are negotiated each year.
Swaps are not just used by large, sophisticated firms, and
the volume of transactions should continue to grow as more
potential users learn of the vast benefits of swaps. Users
include banks and corporations, 5' insurance companies, state
and local governments, international agencies, and foreign
states.5" Although the market is concentrated in New York
and London, transactions take place around the globe.
3.1.4. The Participation of Financial Intermediaries in the
Swap Market
Swap contracts trade on the over-the-counter ("OTC")
market.53 Although the OTC market provides flexibility to
create customized contracts that are unavailable on an
organized exchange, 4 it lacks a clearinghouse.55 Therefore,
Kalis Westminster Group NV and ICI Finance Limited (brokered by
Continental Illinois and Goldman Sachs). See HENDERSON AND PRICE, supra
note 38, at 4. For a history of the origins of the swap market, see id. at 1.
49 See INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. &
ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., S.C., MARKET SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS, YEAR ENDED
1993 (1994) [hereinafter ISDA 1993 REPORT]. These figures are derived by
converting all swaps to their U.S. dollar equivalents.
50 See id. Equity and commodity swaps are negligible in comparison to
interest rate and currency swaps, amounting to $10 billion and $18 billion
notional amount outstanding respectively as of year-end 1992. See G-30
REPORT, supra note 26, at 57.
" According to the Survey of Industry Practice conducted by the Group
of Thirty, roughly 87% of the private sector corporations surveyed used
interest rate swaps and 64% used currency swaps. See id. at 34-35. The
survey was conducted pursuant to the G-30 Report among a group of eighty
dealers and seventy-two end-users of derivatives. See id. at 7.
52 See Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations in
International Banking, in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1988,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 56 (1988).
" The OTC market is a decentralized market in which transactions are
privately negotiated and conducted among dealers, brokers, and the public
off of an organized exchange.
54 An exchange is a legal entity organized for the purpose of trading
securities, options, or futures. It provides a central physical trading facility
and stipulates rules and standardized terms which govern all transactions
involving the instruments being traded thereon.
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unlike exchange-traded contracts, swaps must be individually
negotiated with a particular counterparty,56 and the ability
of the specific, identifiable counterparty to honor its
contractual commitments is a vital issue. "[Tlhe price of
contractual freedom is a greater risk of default."" Other
prices of contractual freedom are the loss of liquidity offered
by an exchange and the burden of searching for a willing
counterparty. Financial intermediaries, however, have
assumed a special role in the swap market, ameliorating some
of these costs and drawbacks.
Contrary to the example outlined in Figure 1, rarely will
the needs of two counterparties exactly coincide as to the
desired type of swap, the notional amount, and the size and
timing of the swap payments. Even if two parties did have
exactly complementary needs, there is no reason to believe
that they would find each other, nor that they would be willing
to enter into an agreement if they did find each other.5"
Instead, they would interpose a bank or investment bank to
intermediate the transaction in order to reduce credit risks.
During the market's infancy, intermediaries facilitated
swaps by acting as brokers or agents for a fee, matching
counterparties with offsetting requirements, without taking a
principal position in the transaction. The intermediary's role,
however, slowly evolved into one of a dealer attempting to
match offsetting counterparties by acting as a principal and
earning a bid-ask spread (see Figure 2)."
." A clearinghouse is a corporation that is separate from, but associated
with, an exchange, and it is composed of the member brokers and dealers
transacting on the exchange. After a buyer and seller enter into a trade, the
clearinghouse steps in and is interposed as a principal to every contract,
becoming the "buyer's seller" and the "seller's buyer"; the buyer and seller
no longer deal directly with each other. The existence of a clearinghouse
eliminates the need for participants in the market to examine the credit
quality of the actual counterparty, and therefore makes the market
accessible to members of the general public. The impersonality of the
clearinghouse also enables participants to close out their positions at any
time.
" Despite recent efforts, a large-scale clearinghouse for swaps and other
OTC contracts has yet to materialize.
57 Hu, supra note 4, at 1465.
s See Hu supra note 8, at 355.
, Also known as a bid-offer spread, the bid-ask spread in this context
represents the slight differential between the price at which the bank is
willing to buy a specified cash flow, and the price at which it is willing to
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Figure 2: An Intermediated Swap.Z ] 8.10% fixed 8% fixed
UBOR ' L Ii LIBOR 1
These intermediaries, known as swap dealers, now stand
ready to "make markets" in swaps, and therefore provide
liquidity, by entering into a swap agreement with one party as
principal in the anticipation that a matching counterparty can
be located in the future.8 0 For certain swaps, the swap dealer
may never find a perfect match, and therefore must use
dynamic hedging to neutralize its risk exposure throughout the
life of the swap. In other instances, the dealer may have other
assets which provide a natural hedge, or it may simply remain
unhedged with the expectation of profiting from favorable
movements in the underlying swap rates."1
Intermediaries provide the swap market with liquidity.
Without them, it would be difficult for market participants to
find willing counterparties in a timely and efficient fashion.
Intermediaries also simplify credit evaluation, because
counterparties need only evaluate the credit quality of the
intermediary, which is generally an institution whose
creditworthiness is well known and of high quality. While the
intermediary still must evaluate the credit risk of the
individual counterparties, these institutions specialize in this
determination. Additionally, banks already lend to some of the
participants in the OTC market, and therefore already possess
more knowledge than other market participants about the
credit risk of certain counterparties6 2
sell it. In Figure 2, the bank bid 8% fixed payments to buy LIBOR, yet to
sell LIBOR the bank asked 8.10%. In other words, the spread is the 10
basis point differential between the fixed rate the bank is receiving from A
and the rate it is paying B.
"' This is known as "warehousing," which requires that the intermediary
hedge the market risk that is inherent in this swap until a counterparty
desiring an opposite position can be found.
*l Methods used to hedge market risks are discussed infra Section 3.3.2.
62 See Sean Becketti, Are Derivatives Too Risky for Banks?, ECON. REV.,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY at 27, 33 (3d Quarter 1993).
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Aside from acting as swap dealers, financial institutions
also act as end-users by entering into swaps to hedge their
own business risks, or to accept certain risks by speculating or
trading. In particular, banks are normally exposed to
substantial interest rate risk, because most of their assets
earn a fixed and long-term rate, while most of their liabilities
tend to be floating and short-term.3  Rather than
rearranging its entire balance sheet, a bank can use interest
rate swaps to immunize its exposure to interest rates caused
by this mismatch and lock in a fixed spread return on its
assets. To the extent that a bank's assets are denominated in
a foreign currency, currency swaps can be used to eliminate
the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. Over 92% of the
financial institutions who responded to the G-30 Industry
Survey used interest rate swaps, while approximately 46%
utilized currency swaps.4
As more intermediaries have entered the swap market, it
has become increasingly more competitive and efficient. In the
early 1980s, bid-ask spreads as high as 100 basis points 5
were not uncommon.6 For most competitive transactions,
these spreads have narrowed to five or ten basis points,
although unique and illiquid contracts will generally have
higher spreads.6 " "From a handful of rudimentary deals in
the 1970s, swaps have mushroomed into one of the largest and
most efficient financial markets on earth .... "68
Despite the scope of the market, most swap activities are
concentrated among the world's largest banks. Of the 5000
banks that report international banking activity,
approximately fifty worldwide report OTC market-making
6" The volatility of interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
the corresponding losses experienced by banks and S&Ls in the United
States demonstrates that this type of mismatch between assets and
liabilities is a recipe for disaster.
64 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 40-41.
65 A basis point equals one-hundredth of one percent (.01%).
'6See HULL, supra note 29, at 145.
6 Id See also Keith Schap, When Domino Theory Meets OTC Credit
Risk, FUTURES: MAGAZINE OF COMMODITIES & OPTIONS, Aug. 1992 at 38, 42.
6" William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks,
Bus. WK., June 1, 1992, at 102.
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swap activity, and of these fifty, about twenty conduct the
lion's share of the business."9
Swaps account for a growing share of revenues and profits
for banks and securities firms,70 present opportunities to
strengthen relationships with customers, and provide clear
benefits to the marketplace. However, swaps do involve risks.
The most notable risks are credit risk, or the possibility that
a counterparty to a contract will default on its obligations, and
market risk, or the possibility that a swap's value will fall. As
will be explained infra, these risks, in the context of swaps,
are two sides of the same coin. A counterparty is exposed to
credit risk when a swap increases in value, yet will be exposed
to market risk by the potential that the swap may decline in
value. However, almost every banking activity involves these
risks, even basic transactions such as lending money or
investing in securities. The next few sections will explore,
among other things, whether swap risks are in any way more
complex or difficult to manage than the risks presented by
more traditional banking activities.7 1
3.2. Swap Credit Risk
3.2.1. Credit Risk Defined
Any time a contract involves the payment of sums in the
future, the party to whom such payments are due is exposed
to credit risk. While counterparties to an exchange-traded
derivatives contract are partially protected against this risk by
the guarantee of the clearinghouse and the use of margin
requirements," counterparties to an OTC swap are exposed
*s Global leaders include J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust, Merrill Lynch,
Citicorp, Chemical Bank, Paribas, Chase Manhattan, Swiss Bank, Barclays,
Midland, Soci6t6 G~n~rale and Deutsche Bank. See Michelle Celarier, The
Biggest Banks in Derivatives, GLOBAL FIN., Aug. 1993, at 27, 27-32.
7* A bank earns profits when it acts as a broker/dealer by earning the
bid-ask spread. Other sources of profit include transaction fees, trading
profits, and advisory fees.
7' Although swaps come in numerous forms, the underlying analysis of
the risks each type of swap entails is substantially similar. Therefore, the
following risk analysis will focus mainly on the interest rate swap paradigm
presented above, with certain specific references to currency swaps.
7 2 Those who enter into an exchange-traded derivatives contract must
post a certain amount of earnest money as "margin." This amount functions
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to substantial credit risk because there is a danger that a
counterparty may default on its obligations prior to the
completion of the swap."' This risk is so important that
many users restrict their swap dealings to intermediaries with
AAA or AA credit ratings. Despite this, creditworthiness can
deteriorate drastically over the life of a swap, as evidenced by
the bankruptcy and subsequent swap defaults suffered by
Olympia & York."4
Although it is clear that swaps pose this risk, its
measurement is less straightforward. When a bank makes a
loan, its maximum exposure is readily quantifiable, and is
equal to the amount of the loan plus the promised interest
payments. A swap's credit exposure is difficult to determine,
however, because the future obligations of each party under
the swap contract will vary depending on changes in the
underlying reference rate(s)."
The value of a swap to each party at inception is usually
zero (referred to as "at the money").7 However, as the
underlying reference rate(s) change over the life of the swap,
the swap will have positive value to one of the parties
(referred to as "in the money") and a corresponding negative
as collateral, and is used to ensure that the parties will be able to fulfill
their future obligations under the contract. In the event that an individual
defaults on his or her obligation and the margin payments are insufficient
to cover the losses on the contract, the remaining loss will be borne by the
reserves of the clearinghouse. There is a possibility that the clearinghouse
itself will go bankrupt, but this generally is considered to be a remote
possibility.
s See infra Section 3.2.5. for a discussion of swap defaults.
74 Despite the importance of credit risk, swap rates do not generally vary
with the creditworthiness of the counterparty. Most dealers have
historically offered the same swap rate to any investment grade
counterparty, such that the swap is made on an all or none basis. A poorer
credit counterparty will be refused the swap unless it posts collateral. See
Robert W. McLeod & D.K. Malhorta, Emerging Trends in Interest Rate
Swaps, BANKERS MAG., May/June 1993, at 44, 49. For further explanation
of this phenomenon, see Litzenberger, supra note 45, at 836. Certain
institutions, however, recently have begun to "price" credit risk differentials
into their swap rates.
" See Figure 1 supra Section 3.1.1. Swap payments between A and B
vary according to changes in LIBOR over time.
76 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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value to the other counterparty (referred to as "out of the
money").
7 7
Not only will the credit exposure vary in magnitude over
time as market rates change, but, in contrast to a loan in
which only the lender bears credit risk, the party bearing the
credit risk in a swap can shift over time. Yet, at any
particular point in time, only the "in the money" counterparty
will be exposed to credit risk,7 8 because this positive value
would be lost if the other counterparty were to default on the
swap. An alternative expression of this loss is what it would
"cost" the non-defaulting party to replace a defaulted swap
with its economic equivalent. 9 This is known as the swap's
replacement cost, which is the cost of obtaining a replacement
swap on the same terms and for the time remaining on the
initial swap in the event of the counterparty's default. This
replacement cost is normally measured by the swap's mark-to-
market value.80
As an example, consider the interest rate paradigm
represented in Figure 2.81 The bank is acting as an
intermediary between two matching counterparties, and is
therefore perfectly hedged against any market risks caused by
changes in interest rates. Any change in the value of the
bank's swap agreement with company A will be perfectly offset
by the change in the value of the mirror swap with company
B. However, since one swap of the pair will have positive
"As interest rates fluctuate, the swap indicated in Figure 1 may be "in
the money" for the fixed-rate payer at one reset date and for the floating-
rate payer at the next reset date.
7" This refers to a swap's current credit exposure, which simply depends
on the value of the swap. It is possible, however, for both parties to be
simultaneously exposed to potential future exposure. See infra Section
3.2.4.
' See Hu, supra note 8, at 359.
A swap's mark-to-market value is a measure of its current value, and
is calculated by taking the present value of the net payments the holder
expects to receive over the life of the contract. This measurement can be
calculated by conceptualizing the swap as two bonds. A fixed-rate payer has
purchased (is "long") a floating-rate bond and has sold (is "short) a fixed-
rate bond. The value of the swap is the difference between the value of
these two bonds. See HULL, supra note 29, at 146; Hu, supra note 8, at 359-
60. A currency swap can be evaluated in a similar manner. See HULL,
supra note 29, at 153.
81 See Figure 2, supra Section 3.1.4.
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value at any point in time,"2 the bank is unable to eliminate
its exposure to credit risk. Assume that each swap
represented in Figure 2 has a five year maturity and that at
the end of the second year of the swap, the market rate for a
three year swap (the remaining life on the initial swap) is 10%
fixed for LIBOR.8" As long as both parties continue to make
their promised payments, the change in interest rates will not
affect the bank. However, if B were to default on its swap
(and if the bank wanted to remain hedged), the bank would
have to pay a new counterparty an up front premium to
"assume" B's swap position. Alternatively, the bank could
enter a new swap and pay the higher current market rate of
10% fixed in order to receive the same LIBOR payments it was
receiving under its initial swap agreement with B. The
replacement cost of the swap is the present discounted value
of this 2% differential (multiplied by the notional amount of
the swap) over the remaining three years of the swap.'
To summarize, credit risk materializes only when one
counterparty fails to make its agreed upon swap payments and
the rates underlying the swap have changed such that the non-
defaulting party can arrange a replacement swap only on
terms that require it to make a payment to its new
counterparty.85 Since the contract can only be "in the money"
82 Ignoring the effect of the bid-ask spread and the potential for either
swap to be "at the money".
8 In other words, fixed interest rates have risen, such that A's swap with
the bank is "in the money", because A's fixed-rate swap payments of 8.10%
are below the current market rate. Conversely, B's swap with the bank is
now "out of the money" for the same reason.
84 Should B default, the bank would have to pay $2,000 more each year.
The replacement cost can be calculated by discounting these payments using
the current market swap rate as the discount rate: = 2,000/1.10 + 2,000/
(1.10)2 + 2,000/(1.10)3 = $4,974.
The mark-to-market value can also be determined by valuing the swap
as two bonds. The present value of the fixed-rate portion of the swap at the
end of the second year equals the remaining payments discounted by the
current swap rate. 8,000/1.10 + 8,000/(1.10)2 + 108,000/(l10)3 = $95,026.
The present value of the floating-rate bond simply equals par of
$100,000, because the swap has just completed its second year, and the
floating rate has just been reset to the current market rate. The $4,974
difference between the floating bond and the fixed bond is the mark-to-
market value of the swap.
85 There is no current credit exposure when a contract has negative
value, because if the counterparty defaults, the non-defaulting counterparty
could arrange a replacement swap identical to the old while receiving a
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for one party at any particular moment, only one party to the
swap can be exposed to actual credit risk at any one time.
However, an intermediary with a matched swap arrangement
will always be exposed to credit risk.
3.2.2. Methods to Mitigate Credit Risk
Although all swaps have inherent credit risk, various
methods can be used to mitigate such risk. One common
method of mitigation is to require that a swap counterparty
have a high credit rating. According to a 1991 survey by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.
("ISDA"), 91% of all swaps executed by ISDA members were
with investment grade counterparties8 6 In response to this,
several financial intermediaries have established separately
capitalized AAA or AA rated derivatives subsidiaries.87 A
second way to minimize credit risk is by limiting exposure to
any one counterparty. Diversifying the swap portfolio
geographically and by industry can minimize credit risk as
well.
Even though swap counterparties generally have better
than average credit ratings, swap participants may utilize
bilateral and unilateral collateral agreements to further
protect their interests.88 In most instances, a counterparty
that has a poor credit rating will be unable to enter into a
"windfall" payment from its new counterparty.
"' Arthur Andersen & Co., S.C., ISDA Default Survey, at 4, Dec. 31, 1991
(on file with the Journal). ISDA is an international organization comprised
of approximately 250 of the world's largest commercial banks and securities
firms involved in OTC derivatives transactions. ISDAmembers also include
end-users and consultative firms that provide accounting, systems and legal
support for derivatives activity. Practically all swap dealers are members
of ISDA.
" Some examples include the establishment of GS Financial Products
International, L.P. (by Goldman Sachs Equity Markets L.P.) and Merrill
Lynch Derivative Products, Inc. (by Merrill Lynch & Co.). See John P.
Behof, Reducing Credit Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives, ECON. PERSP.:
REV. FROM FED. RESERVE BANK CHi., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 21, 22. In addition,
similar subsidiaries have been formed by Credit Suisse, First Boston and
National Westminster. See McLeod & Malhorta, supra note 74, at 50.
"' In a bilateral agreement, both counterparties to the swap exchange
collateral. A unilateral agreement requires only one counterparty, generally
the one with a lower credit rating, to post collateral. See Behof, supra note
87, at 26.
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swap without posting collateral. Collateral agreements
generally require the transferral of cash or liquid securities to
the "in the money" counterparty when the swap's mark-to-
market value reaches certain thresholds, or at regularly
scheduled intervals. In the event of a swap default, the
collateral will be used to compensate the non-defaulting party
to the extent of any losses incurred. Therefore, collateral
reduces the current credit exposure of the swap and reduces
the length of future exposure to the period between collateral
calls."9  Despite the benefits of collateral, most dealers
reported in 1993 that less than 5% of their gross credit
exposure was collateralized. 0 Nonetheless, since that time,
the use of collateral to reduce credit risk has dramatically
increased.9"
Another method of minimizing credit risk, analogous to the
treatment of futures contracts, is to periodically mark the
swap contract to market at specified time intervals. At each
interval, the "out of the money" counterparty is required to
make a cash payment equal to the mark-to-market exposure,
after which the terms of the swap are reset to market rates. 2
However, this process requires that both parties agree on a
common measurement of the mark-to-market value, which
may be difficult in the case of innovative or complex contracts.
In addition, the counterparties will remain exposed to changes
in the value of the swap in-between the mark-to-market
intervals. Alternatively, parties may provide for contractual
termination and mandatory cash settlement of the mark-to-
market value upon the occurrence of a triggering event, such
as a credit downgrade.9 Similarly, some swaps allow for
discretionary cash settlement by including an option to
89 See Letter from Joseph Bauman, Chairman of ISDA, to Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency 4 (Sept. 17, 1993) (on file with author).
so See GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, THE GROUP OF THIRTY,
DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, APPENDIX I: WORKING PAPERS 37
(July 1993) [hereinafter G-30 APPENDIX].
91 See Alice Ratcliffe, U.S. OTC Market Seen Looking To Collateralize
Swaps, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne
Pile.
92 See Katerina Simons, Interest Rate Structure and the Credit Risk of
Swaps, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1993, at 23, 33.
" See Behof, supra note 87, at 28.
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terminate the swap prior to its maturity at predetermined
settlement dates. 4
Other credit-reducing techniques include the use of
guarantees, assignments, and private swap insurance.9
However, it is expensive to assign swaps and difficult to find
a buyer for swaps with low-rated counterparties. Although
swap insurance is obtainable, it is not widely available or
utilized. 6
3.2.3. Bilateral Netting Agreements
Perhaps the most aggressive push to reduce credit risk
entails the use of netting agreements. Netting, which
originated from the common law doctrine of set-off, is the
reduction of credit risk between two parties through the
offsetting of mutual obligations and liabilities." One form of
netting, payment netting, has already been mentioned."
Another more important concept is contractual netting upon
termination, often referred to as "close-out" or bilateral
netting. This provides that, in the event of a default or
triggering event, all contracts subject to a valid netting
agreement will be terminated and all mark-to-market positions
will be netted, so that a single amount will be owed from one
party to the other.
For example, if company A has two different swaps with
company B, one "in the money" and one "out of the money,"
and B defaults on the "in the money" swap, A is still obligated
to continue payments on the "out of the money" swap absent
an agreement to the contrary. If bilateral netting is
applicable, however, the mark-to-market value of the "in the
money" and "out of the money" contracts can be offset against
94 See id.
"See id. at 30.
36 For example, Deutsche Bank and the Capital Markets Assurance
Corporation have been providers of swap insurance. For the proposition
that swap insurance could be more widely used, see Hu, supra note 8, at
413-18. However, even if obtained, there would still be credit risk exposure
to the insurer.
"' See Edward J. Nalbantian et al., Netting and Derivatives--a Practical
Guide, INTVL FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1993, at 38, 38.
"' Under a single contract, the mutual payment obligations of each party
are netted so that, on each payment date, the party with the larger payment
obligation simply pays the difference. See supra Section 3.1.1.
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each other in the event of default. This prevents the
counterparty or bankruptcy trustee from retaining the positive
contract while defaulting on the negative one.
In practice, counterparties who deal with each other on a
regular basis will, execute what is known as a "master
agreement," which delineates standard terms for any future
swaps between the parties, including the applicability of
bilateral netting.9 Future swaps are incorporated into this
master agreement through the use of written confirmation
statements. Some counterparties utilize cross-product
bilateral netting, which nets swaps with other types of
derivative contracts."°
In order for bilateral netting to succeed in reducing credit
risk, it must be legally enforceable under applicable
bankruptcy and contract law. If a court were to disregard an
otherwise valid netting provision, a bankruptcy trustee could
default on any swaps with negative value (requiring the
counterparty to file a bankruptcy claim), yet still require the
performance of swaps that have positive value with the same
counterparty. It is widely believed that the use of netting
arrangements, assuming their legal validity, reduces actual
credit risks by thirty to fifty percent.'0 ' Their legality and
applicability for capital adequacy purposes will be discussed
below.
3.2.4. Swap Credit Risk Measurement
In order to determine whether Basle's provisions accurately
reflect a swap's credit risk, it is first necessary to quantify this
risk from a theoretical or normative perspective against which
Basle can subsequently be compared. Although there are
" Master agreements will generally contain two parts. The first part
sets forth the basic terms applicable to all transactions, while the second
contains terms which may be complemented, supplemented, or varied for
particular swaps. See Schuyler K. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-
Perspective Analysis, 44 Bus. LAW. 365, 386 n.26. Most swaps are executed
under a standard master agreement developed by ISDA, or a variation
thereof. See id. at 386-87.
See Behof, supra note 87, at 25-26.
101 Saul Hansell & Kevin Muehring, Why Derivatives Rattle the
Regulators, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 29, 1992, at 49, 62.
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numerous ways to think about swap credit risk, what follows
is a commonly accepted method used to quantify it.
A swap's credit risk can be broken down into two related
concepts, "current exposure" and "potential exposure." The
current exposure of a swap is the value that would be lost if
the other counterparty were currently to default on the swap.
Potential exposure refers to the extent to which a counterparty
could be exposed to credit risk in the future, depending on
movements in the underlying swap rate(s) over the remaining
life of the swap.'O' The current exposure can be analogized
to the temperature on a given day, while the potential
exposure is akin to how hot it might reasonably get in the
future."' As a first approximation, a swap's credit risk can
be determined simply by multiplying the probability of a
counterparty default by the sum of (1) the swap's current
exposure and (2) the swap's potential exposure over the life of
the swap.'" As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to
quantify swap credit risk.
Current exposure can be assessed by utilizing the concept
of replacement cost, discussed earlier, which simply equals the
greater of the swap's mark-to-market value or zero. However,
this calculation assumes that there is a liquid market for the
swap from which market rates can be obtained. This may not
be the case for all swaps. In addition, this approach "is not
'bulletproof,' cautions one regulator, because it is based on
what many believe to be the dubious assumption that there
will in fact be market liquidity at the exact moment in a crisis
when it is needed most."" 5 Furthermore, in the event of an
actual default, certain transaction costs which have not been
accounted for will be incurred in the process of creating a
replacement swap. In spite of this, the replacement cost is
generally a reasonable estimate of a swap's current credit
exposure, although adjustments would need to be made for any
applicable credit enhancements. For example, the value of any
collateral currently held should be subtracted from the swap's
mark-to-market value, because it would offset the replacement
102 See Hu, supra note 8, at 360-61.
103 See id. at 361.
104 Credit mitigating methods are ignored for now.
105 Hansell & Muehring, supra note 101, at 61.
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cost to the non-defaulting party."6 In addition, the net
exposure with a particular counterparty, rather than the gross
exposure, should be used if there is a legally valid bilateral
netting arrangement.
The measurement of potential exposure is much more
difficult to calculate because it requires the use of statistical
techniques to forecast possible changes in a swap's value. A
common method involves entering the parameters of the swap
into a computer-generated model which, in turn, analyzes the
credit exposure over the life of the swap under thousands of
simulated movements in the underlying swap rate(s). These
simulated movements will be a function of a given belief about
the volatility of the underlying variable(s) and a given
assumption about future movements. These "Monte Carlo"
simulations can provide a measure of the expected future
exposure over the life of the swap (which is the sum of all
possible probability-weighted replacement costs), as well as the
maximum potential exposure over the life of the swap within
a certain confidence level."7 Generally, these simulations
will either utilize measurements of the historical volatility of
the underlying rate(s), or incorporate assumptions about the
distribution of expected future rates.' As an example of
such a simulation, consider the following study by Katerina
Simons, who performed a Monte Carlo simulation for interest
rate swaps of various maturities."'
Simons's simulation assumed that interest rates follow a
random walk in accordance with historical volatility and a
lognormal distribution." 0 In order to isolate credit exposure
106 Strictly speaking, the actual reduction in current exposure will
depend on the type of collateral. A full offset would only be appropriate if
the collateral were in the form of cash or short-term government securities.
107 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 18.
... See Daniela Giberti et al., The Valuation of Credit Risk in Swaps:
Methodological Issues and Empirical Results, J. FIXED INCOME, Mar. 1993,
at 24, 28.
... See Simons, supra note 92, at 24, 29-31.
11 In a random walk of this nature, a simulated change in swap rates is
independent of previous changes in rates. In addition, the rate has no
implicit upward or downward trend; it is as likely to fall as it is to rise. See
id. at 30.
The historical volatilities used in the study were calculated by ISDA
based on the monthly difference of daily observations between January 1979
and March 1987. See id. at 30 n.3. The resulting annualized volatilities are
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from market exposure, matched pairs of swaps were analyzed,
simulating the credit exposure of an intermediary that is
perfectly hedged with two matching swaps. The credit risk for
the swap pair was calculated at each payment period (i.e.
every six months) by calculating the replacement cost of the
"in the money" swap using a string of generated future interest
rates."' For example, to test a 10 year swap, Simons
started with the current 10 year swap rate and then generated
20 different interest rates corresponding to the 20 payment
periods over the life of the swap. This process was repeated
5,000 times."2 All replacement costs in each period were
discounted to the present and were represented as a
percentage of the notional principal amount. The values
generated by the simulation determined the expected
replacement cost (Figure 3), the maximum replacement cost
over the swap's life within a certain confidence level (Table 1)
and the mean expected lifetime exposure (Table 1).
According to Table 1, for a ten year matched swap, the
maximum exposure will be less than or equal to 8.28% of the
notional amount in 95% of the cases. In other words, in only
5% of the simulations did the credit exposure rise above this
value. For each interest period, the expected credit exposures
in Figure 3 represent an average of the 5,000 simulated
replacement costs, discounted to the present, as a percentage
of the notional amount. For example, the expected exposure
for the ten year swap in year 3 is approximately 6%. The
mean expected lifetime exposure for this swap is 4.03%, which
is calculated by averaging the expected exposure for each
period.
as follows:
Swap Maturity 10-Year 7-Year 5-Year 3-Year 1-Year
Volatility .142 .148 .160 .166 .195
Id.
A second simulation, not discussed here, used the forward interest rates
implied by the shape of the swap yield curve as a forecast of expected future
swap rates.
... See id. at 30-31.
1'2 See id. at 31.
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Table 1: Exposures on a Matched Pair of Swaps as a Percent
of Notional Principal.'
Swap 10- 7- 5- 3-
Maturity Year Year Year Year 1-Year
Confidence
Interval
99% 11.22 7.78 5.12 2.25 .34
95% 8.28 5.67 3.59 1.63 .24
90% 6.93 4.71 3.06 1.37 .20
75% 5.12 3.37 2.22 .98 .14
Mean





Potential Credit Exposure of Interest Rate
Percent of Notional Principal
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Semiannual Periods
113 See id. at 32.
114 See id. at 33.
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This study simulates the potential exposure over the life of
each swap pair from its inception. Therefore, the original
maturity for each swap also equals the residual maturity of
the swap. The results, however, hinge on the residual
maturity, and are applicable to swaps entered into previously.
At inception, for example, the lifetime potential exposure for
a ten year swap has a mean expected value of 4.03%. After
three years (in which case the swap may also have current
exposure), the potential exposure for the remaining life can be
obtained from the seven year swap results, such that the
swap's potential exposure would decline to 2.68%.
Several patterns are revealed by this analysis, including
the obvious fact that the potential replacement cost, and
therefore credit risk, varies over the life of the swap. Over
time, the effect on the potential exposure is influenced by the
"diffusion effect," which is the increase in the probability that
the underlying variable will drift from its initial value, and the
"amortization effect," which is the reduction in cash flows that
need to be replaced as time passes. "As the swap approaches
maturity, the exposure starts to decline, since fewer and fewer
periods remain in which the difference between the initial and
the current rates can accumulate.""' This basic pattern of
a gradual increase followed by a decline holds for all par
interest rate swaps." 6 Another trend is that the longer the
maturity of the swap, the greater the exposure because rates
have a longer time to deviate from the initial rate."7
In contrast to interest rate swaps, the shape of a typical
currency swap potential exposure profile (Figure 4) is upward
sloping. This reflects the fact that the exchange of principal
at maturity reduces the influence of the amortization effect.
The upward-sloping shape also reflects the fact that currency
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One could refine this analysis of potential exposure by
taking account of valid credit enhancements. For example, to
the extent that a swap's collateral is greater than its current
exposure, the amount of overcollateralization would offset the
potential exposure." 9  The effect of valid netting
arrangements can also be incorporated by simulating the effect
of rate changes on all swaps with a particular counterparty in
order to calculate the net potential exposure with that
counterparty. Further refinements could be made by
analyzing an institution's entire portfolio of swaps under the
simulation, rather than simply analyzing an individual swap
or a matched swap pair. 20
118 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 20.
"1 But see Hansell & Muehring, supra note 101, at 61 (noting that the
actual reduction in current exposure depends on the type of collateral).
120 Amore complicated model would incorporate changes in interest rates
and exchange rates, such that cross-currency swaps could also be
incorporated. See generally, David A. Hsieh, Assessing the Market and
Credit Risks of Long-Term Interest Rate and Foreign Currency Products,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1993, at 75 (using such a model to analyze the
risk exposures of long-term assets and liabilities).
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These simulations, however, are only approximations.
Their usefulness is predicated on the validity of the underlying
assumptions, the most important of which will be the
assumption about the movement in future swap rates. One
typical assumption, found in Simons's study for example, is
that changes are lognormally distributed around a mean
corresponding to historical volatility. Nonetheless, rates may
not display this property. Another approach is to develop
future distributions based on historical data of past
distributions. 2' Yet another method is to assume that
interest rates are mean reverting.'2 2 The use of historical
data itself presents a weakness, however, because there is no
assurance that variables will behave as they did in the past.
Historical volatility would have been a poor indicator, for
example, of the actual volatility of European currencies during
the currency crisis of September 1992.
Another issue is whether the expected exposure or the
maximum exposure is a more appropriate measure of potential
exposure. From a financial "pricing" perspective, the expected
exposure seems more appropriate. However, from a regulatory
perspective, where the concern is the potential for bank failure
caused by extreme rate changes, the maximum exposure may
be more suitable. If the latter measure is used, it is also
necessary to stipulate an appropriate confidence interval. Any
statistical simulation will have extremes to the distribution.
To include those few extreme outcomes, however, is to effect a
dramatic increase in the measure of potential exposure. For
example, in Table 1, moving from the 95% confidence level to
the 99% confidence level for a 10 year swap results in
approximately a 36% increase in potential exposure.
"Admittedly, the 99 percent confidence interval implies an
121 The method still utilizes a random walk, but rather than assuming
a lognormal distribution, the random walk will follow a reference
distribution derived from historical data. See Giberti et al., supra note 108,
at 28 (using historical data to quantify the credit exposures of various
swaps). See also Hsieh, supra note 120, at 76 (using a monthly model of
global interest rates and exchange rates by using historical data to describe
the statistical behavior, and then using a simulation algorithm to generate
future outcomes).
122 Interest rates tend to display mean reverting behavior, such that the
higher they rise, the more pressure there is for them to fall to a lower level,
and vice versa. This method assumes that there is some natural level that
interest rates tend toward over time.
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extremely cautious measure of lifetime credit exposure, and
less cautious estimates may be appropriate."' Although
capital requirements based on higher confidence intervals
would reduce the probability that a bank would default, there
are real costs to maintaining higher levels of capital.
Another issue is the appropriate time horizon for assessing
the potential exposure. Although Simons examines the
potential exposure over the remaining life of the swap, a
shorter time frame may be appropriate for regulatory purposes
if a swap's current exposure is updated frequently."M
Once the measures of current and potential exposure for a
swap are identified, these measures must be combined with a
credit analysis of default probability. The simplest way to
take default into account is to multiply the sum of the current
and potential exposures by a probability of default depending
on the perceived credit quality of the counterparty and the
maturity of the transaction.1 25  This method assumes that
this probability is constant over the life of the swap and is
independent of changes in the underlying swap rate(s). An
alternative and more refined method is to treat default and
underlying rate movements as dependent events by
incorporating the probability of default into the simulation of
potential exposure. 2 ' In addition, a further distinction can
123 Simons, supra note 92, at 32.
124 The concern from a regulatory standpoint is that the value of the
swap will increase over time and the counterparty will default, causing a
loss equal to the mark-to-market value at the time of default. Therefore,
capital is assessed against the current credit exposure to protect the bank
against a default today, and it is assessed against some measure of potential
exposure, to protect the bank from a possible default in the future.
Nonetheless, in an extreme case where the current exposure, and hence the
amount of capital assessed against such exposure, is continuously and
instantaneously adjusted, potential exposure would theoretically be
irrelevant, because the continual updating of the capital required for the
current exposure would always be sufficient to cover a loss in the future.
The real concern is that the swap's value will change before the current
exposure component of capital can be updated, and that the bank will be
unable to acquire such capital at the time of default. Capital for future
potential exposure is set aside as a precautionary measure to guard against
this contingency.
' The longer the maturity of the swap, the greater the probability that
a counterparty's credit rating may deteriorate over time.
126 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 25. For example, since weaker
counterparties to an interest rate swap tend to pay fixed and receive
floating, they are unlikely to default when rates move higher. See Simons,
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be made between the current probability of default, which
would be applied to the current exposure, and the future
probability of default, which would be applied to the potential
exposure.
Although the calculation of current and potential exposure
seems like an abstract and technical academic exercise, banks
often perform this kind of simulation or a comparable model-
based analysis to manage their own credit exposure.
Sophisticated dealers will calculate credit risk on a daily or
even intra-day basis, while less sophisticated end-users may
only recalculate credit risk exposure on a monthly or quarterly
basis. Dealers and end-users without the sophistication to
perform these types of analyses often utilize tables of factors
developed under the same principles as a full sensitivity
analysis. 27
It is essential to realize that while the notional values of
these swaps are extremely large, they bear little relation to
the amount of credit risk. A pilot study by ISDA surveyed 14
leading swap dealers at year-end 1993 and found that their
net replacement value of outstanding interest rate and
currency swaps was $101.3 billion or 1.22% of the total
notional amount of all such swaps outstanding. The gross
replacement value was $178.4 billion or 2.15%.128 In fact,
despite the concerns, swap defaults have been minimal.
3.2.5. Actual Default Experiences
In 1992, ISDA conducted a default survey in order to assess
the true level of credit risk and loss experiences in the swap
market. The swaps entered into by the survey respondents
represented 70% of the total volume of outstanding swaps.1
2 9
At December 31, 1991, cumulative losses in swaps totaled
supra note 92, at 33.
117 G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 14.
128 Study Clarifies Credit Risk, DERIVATIVES WEEK, June 13, 1994 at 2,
available in LEXIS, Banking library, II file. Recall that the notional
amounts are never exchanged in an interest rate swap. The exposure for a
currency swap is greater, because the notional amounts will change hands,
but the exposure is still much less than the principal amount, because the
notional amounts are exchanged at maturity. If one party fails to make the
notional payment at maturity, the counterparty is relieved of its obligation
to deliver its notional payment.
129 See ISDA Default Survey, supra note 86.
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$358.36 million.130 This loss represented .0115% of the
$3.105 trillion notional principal amount then outstanding,
and .46% of the gross mark-to-market value of the swaps on
the books of survey respondents. 3' The notional principal
amount of defaulted'32 transactions was $12.8 billion.
Of these losses, almost 50% were caused by a rather
unusual set of circumstances involving the default of swaps
entered into by the London Borough of Hammersmith and
Fulham. In 1991, Hammersmith and Fulham repudiated
numerous losses from swap contracts, and was able to convince
the House of Lords (England's highest court) that it was ultra
vires (beyond their authority) to have entered into the
contracts in the first instance. The Law Lords determined
that the swaps were more akin to gambling than insurance,
and therefore ruled that they were beyond the powers of the
local government, thereby voiding the contracts. If these
unusual losses are excluded from the above figures, total swap
losses amount to less than .01% of the outstanding notional
amount. Table 2 describes other aspects of the default
survey.33
Table 2: Net Loss by Counterparty Type.
Amount
(in millions) Paet




Savings & Loans 20.3 5.6
Other Governmental Entities 3.0 0.8
Non-ISDA Dealers 2.1 0.6




' "Defaulted" refers to the legal definition of default under the ISDA
Master Agreement and includes failure to pay as well as other non-payment
breaches. Id.
I," See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 135.
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Despite the concerns expressed by regulators and others,
very few defaults have occurred, and those that have occurred
have been dealt with successfully. Morgan Guaranty had
swaps worth an estimated $10 million with Olympia & York
when they filed for bankruptcy in 1992. The Federal Reserve
had to unravel billions in swaps left behind by the failure of
the Bank of New England."M Swaps worth $30 billion left
behind by the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert were also
liquidated or transferred successfully, "5  which is
particularly noteworthy because Drexel's derivatives
subsidiary was essentially unregulated. Other successful
liquidations include Development Finance Corp. of New
Zealand and British & Commonwealth in the U.K. Even
Hammersmith and Fulham's defaults did not overwhelm the
system. However, other than Hammersmith and Fulham,
these portfolios were relatively balanced, and regulators are
still wary of the effects of a default involving a large
unbalanced portfolio.'36
3.3. Swap Market Risk
3.3.1. Market Risk Defined
Market risk is the risk that an asset will decline in value.
Such risks can be caused by changes in equity prices,
commodity prices, exchange rates, interest rates, or any other
variable that affects the value of a real, financial, or derivative
asset. Almost all assets are vulnerable to market risks,
including many normally thought to be risk-free, such as long-
term government securities. 37
13 When the Bank of New England was declared insolvent in 1991, it
had a derivatives portfolio of $7 billion with 387 counterparties. The
portfolio was transferred to the FDIC and then sold to Fleet-Norstar. See
Simon Brady, The Ref Gets Rough, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1992, at 25, 28. -
13 See Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 68, at 103.
13 See Brady, supra note 134, at 28.
37 See supra note 22 (noting the effect of interest rate changes on the
value of long term treasury bonds). Market risks are often categorized
according to the factor which underlies the potential change in value. A
change in value caused by a change in interest rates is referred to as
interest rate risk, while the potential for loss caused by a change in
exchange rates is referred to as foreign exchange risk, etc.
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For swaps and other derivatives, market risk and credit
risk are two sides of the same coin. The potential for a rise in
market value exposes a counterparty to credit risk; this risk
will only be realized if the other counterparty defaults. The
potential for unexpected and negative changes in market
values is market risk. While credit risk depends on the
likelihood that the swap will have positive value, market risk
is simply the potential for the swap to lose value."3 8
When two counterparties enter into a swap, they are both
exposed to market risks. For example, the fixed-rate payer of
an interest rate swap will suffer unrealized losses if interest
rates decline, while the floating-rate payer will suffer
unrealized losses if rates increase. But, unlike swap credit
risk, swap market risk can be hedged completely.
3.3.2. Methods to Mitigate Market Risk
Consider the swap paradigm represented in Figure 2, in
which a bank simultaneously enters into a fixed-floating swap
with one party, and a floating-fixed swap with another
counterparty for the same notional amount and on the same
terms.""9 By matching mirror swaps in this fashion, a bank
can theoretically eliminate market risk completely, because
any change in the underlying reference rate causing one of the
swap pairs to be out of the money, will cause the other
matched swap to be in the money by an equal and offsetting
amount. In practice, however, it is very difficult to run a swap
portfolio that is entirely matched. As discussed supra Section
3.1.4., the swap dealer has evolved into an institution ready to
enter into a swap with a counterparty in the absence of an
immediately available offsetting swap. While an offsetting
swap may be found in the future, the dealer will be exposed to
market risks in the interim, as well as over the life of the
1 Although these risks are two sides of the same coin, a party can be
exposed to both risks at the same time. For example, if a swap is in the
money, a counterparty is exposed to current credit risk, but it is also
exposed to the potential for a decline in the value of the swap. Realization
of either of these risks would result in a real economic loss to the value of
the entity.
1" See supra Section 3.1.4. One discrepancy, which does not undermine
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swap to the extent it is unable to find an exactly offsetting
hedge.
In the absence of a matching swap, an intermediary can
hedge its risk exposure by creating a synthetic swap through
the use of treasury bills, futures, forwards, or other financial
instruments. 40 Nonetheless, such hedging may involve a
dynamic strategy which requires adjustment over time. In
addition, limitations on the terms and liquidity of such
instruments may impede the construction of a perfect hedge.
Rather than actively hedging a swap's exposure, a bank
may have a position in other derivatives, assets, or swaps,
which act as a natural hedge. Recall that swaps themselves
are often used to hedge risks of other assets on the balance
sheet. If an intermediary enters into swaps in order to hedge
its exposure to interest rates caused by a duration mismatch
of its assets and liabilities, its effective market risk exposure
as a whole will be minimized. In other words, the swap itself
is acting as a hedge against other on or off-balance-sheet
market risks. As a practical matter, a swap dealer will
generally incorporate swaps into its existing portfolio and use
synthetic instruments to hedge the residual risk.
3.3.3. Swap Market Risk Measurement
The potential market risk of a swap can be analyzed in
much the same way that credit risk was analyzed supra
Section 3.2.4., because credit risk itself is a function of changes
in market value. Recall that swap credit exposure was
determined by adding the swap's current mark-to-market
value to a measure of the swap's potential credit exposure over
some future time period. Similarly, assessing market risks
involves marking the contract to market, and determining the
potential for a future decline in value over a specified time
frame. The same type of Monte Carlo simulation used in
connection with calculating credit exposures can therefore be
used to determine market risk.
140 Since a swap involves a series of cash flows at future dates, those
cash flows can be replicated through the use of other derivatives. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to explain how this would be accomplished,
but see generally Keith Schap, Swaps III: Reducing Risks With Synthetic
Swaps, FUTURES: MAGAZINE OF COMMODITIES & OPTIONS, Aug. 1990, at 42
(describing how synthetic swaps can reduce risks).
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Despite the ability to isolate the market risk for a
particular swap contract, it is imprudent and meaningless to
assess the market risk of a swap in isolation, because this risk
may be hedged with other swaps, other derivative positions, or
other financial or tangible assets. Therefore, when evaluating
market risk, it is essential that all the assets exposed to the
same underlying risk factor be analyzed together. For
example, instead of analyzing the market risk of a single
interest rate swap or a group of swaps, it is necessary to
examine the interest rate risk of the institution as a whole, by
analyzing all of the institution's assets that are influenced by
interest rates under future simulations. An institution's
market risk exposure is too complex and intricate to be
determined by simply summing individual risk assessments of
each asset.
Most banks already employ this kind of factor analysis by
determining the sensitivity of asset values and earnings to
interest rate or exchange rate changes. One such type of
analysis for interest rate risk is called gap analysis, which is
a rudimentary tool that segregates assets and liabilities into
time frames in order to determine mismatches.' 4' More
sophisticated banks use duration analysis, an approach which
is based on cash flows. 42 Other banks use a Monte Carlo
simulation analysis similar to that discussed above to
determine the change in value of all the assets that are
sensitive to changes in interest rates and other variables.
Measuring market risk presents the same, if not greater,
technical challenges as those presented by credit risk
measurement. Dealers must evaluate risk across a wide
variety of derivative and other assets, and must make
assumptions about underlying volatilities and correlations
across instruments and markets."' In addition, certain
illiquid positions may be difficult to value.
141 See Corralling the Interest Rate Risk, BANK MGMT, Feb. 1993, at 26,
30. For example, all assets and liabilities with a maturity between 1 and
2 years will be analyzed together, as will other assets and liabilities within
other maturity bands.
1" For an explanation of duration, see infra note 229.
143 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 4.
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3.4. Other Swap Risks
While swap credit risk and market risk can be substantial,
other risks also exist. Many of these "other" risks, however,
are less subject to measurement and quantification, and many
are really subcategories of credit risk and market risk.
3.4.1. Liquidity Risk
An institution is generally affected by the liquidity and
marketability of its assets. A lack of liquidity may prevent an
institution from buying or selling certain assets, or may result
in a disadvantageous price when doing so. With regard to
swaps, liquidity risk could affect the ability of a bank to
replace a defaulted swap or its ability to synthetically hedge
swaps through the use of market instruments. It is likely that
liquidity will dry up in the aftershock of a swap default, which
could prevent a bank from acquiring a new swap, or from
continuing a synthetic and dynamic hedging strategy (or it
may simply make these actions very costly)."' But as
mentioned previously, the liquidity of the swap market has
withstood the test of several failures. In addition, since a
variety of tradable instruments can be used to synthetically
hedge and replicate swaps, liquidity risks will be limited.
Last, liquidity risk is a risk with which banks are very
familiar because their main assets, commercial loans, are very
illiquid.1l 5
3.4.2. Legal Risk
The greatest legal risk is that a swap or any of its specific
provisions, such as the close-out netting provisions discussed
supra part 3.2.3., will be unenforceable in the event of default
or counterparty bankruptcy. It is feared, for example, that, in
the wake of a default, a particular jurisdiction may declare
netting invalid, thus exposing swap counterparties to great
losses. Although most swap agreements specify that the
44 In other words, a swap's mark-to-market value may not be a good
indication of the true cost of replacing a defaulted swap.
145 See Becketti, supra note 62, at 35. However, the recent development
of the asset securitization market has enhanced the liquidity of certain
loans.
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contract will be governed by New York state law or English
law, jurisdictions which have specifically validated contractual
netting, it is questionable whether such a choice of law
provision would be enforceable if neither party to the swap has
any connection with the stipulatedjurisdiction. Additionally,
in the event of a counterparty bankruptcy, the validity of
netting would be determined by the bankruptcy laws of the
counterparty's domicile, which supersede contract law. Many
have questioned the validity of bankruptcy netting in
jurisdictions other than the United States and England.
Although ISDA has obtained legal opinions from various
jurisdictions regarding the validity of netting in
bankruptcy,146 such opinions are not based on adjudicated
precedents, and the bankruptcy laws of most jurisdictions do
not specifically provide for the validity of netting.
The statute of frauds presents other legal risks. The
common practice of consummating swap agreements over the
phone, followed by a written confirmation, may give grounds
for a party to repudiate a contract ex post. If the follow up
documentation is deemed to be insufficient, or is non-existent,
the statute of frauds may not be satisfied. Nevertheless, New
York specifically amended its statute of frauds in September
1994 to facilitate compliance for swaps and other derivative
transactions.147 The doctrine of ultra vires,1 48 the cause of
the Hammersmith and Fulham defaults, presents another risk
to the extent that an agent or entity enters into swaps without
the proper authority to do so.14' To safeguard against this
risk, standard documentation has been developed, and due
diligence will be carried out by the intermediary to assess the
capacity of the swap counterparty to enter into the swap.
Bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance laws also present legal
risks. It is possible that pre-petition payments on settled swap
agreements could be voidable as preferences or fraudulent
" See infra Section 4.1.2.
147 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-701(B) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
"4 Ultra vires refers to "[aicts beyond the scope of the powers of a
corporation, as defined by its charter or laws of state incorporation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
149 For example, an agent of a corporation may only act on the
corporation's behalf to the extent permitted by the articles of incorporation
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transfers, providing the bankruptcy trustee the ability to seek
indemnification for those payments. 150
A further source of legal risk recently became apparent in
the wake of substantial losses reported by Proctor & Gamble,
Gibson Greetings and other entities from derivatives contracts.
Although many of the facts are unclear, several of these
entities have alleged that the swap dealer which sold them the
contracts did not fully disclose the risks involved in the
complex arrangements. Although such a suit may not
ultimately succeed, there is a danger that any counterparty
with large losses will automatically bring suit, thus pressuring
swap dealers to settle such claims. Such risks create costs and
uncertainties, which could hinder the development of the swap
market.
Realizing that these legal risks and uncertainties are
detrimental to the financial markets, certain countries have
sought to clarify the existing treatment of swaps both through
amending existing legislation and enacting new
legislation. 5'
3.4.3. Settlement Risk
Swaps, like all financial transactions, expose
counterparties to various types of settlement risk. The typical
example of settlement risk arises when one party remits funds
to a counterparty before receiving other funds due from the
same counterparty. 15 2 This situation could be caused by
technical problems with the payment system, or by the sudden
failure of the counterparty. These risks are reduced
dramatically for an individual swap through the use of
payment netting discussed supra Section 3.2.3. There is,
however, the risk that a delay in the settlement of one swap
may hinder a bank's ability to fulfill its own obligations on
160 Thomas Given, Protecting Swap Agreements From Bankruptcy Risks,
FAULKNER & GRAY's BANKR. L. REV., Spring 1991 at 48. Under certain
bankruptcy laws, transfer of a bankrupt's property (such as swap payments)
for little or no consideration at a time when the debtor is insolvent, or for
so little consideration that it renders a debtor's capital unreasonably small,
is considered a fraudulent conveyance and may be avoided by the trustee.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 148, at 662.
161 See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
162 See Becketti, supra note 62, at 36.
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swaps with other counterparties, thereby causing a ripple
effect throughout the payment system.
While the possibility of a payments breakdown exists,
many are quick to point out that the daily flow of payments on
swap transactions is unlikely to exceed $2 billion, which, in
the context of the overall financial markets, is not a large
amount. 153
3.4.4. Operational Risk
Swaps are very complex instruments which require a
tremendous amount of back-office support in order to price
them, mark them to market, and keep track of collateral,
margin calls, and payments. In addition, sophisticated
internal controls are necessary to manage swap credit and
market risk properly. Operational risk is the possibility that
such controls and operations may prove inadequate as a result
of human error or management failure.'" The swap
portfolio must be constantly monitored, 5" and "the cost of
mistakes can mount rapidly."' It is also essential both that
internal controls properly manage credit and market risk, and
that the traders and writers of these instruments are properly
supervised.
3.4.5. Systemic Risks
Regulators are concerned that any of the foregoing risks,
especially credit and market risks, could lead to a failure or
liquidity crisis, thereby precipitating a collapse of the banking
system. This systemic risk, or the risk that a disruption at a
bank or investment bank could reverberate to other such
institutions and across various financial markets, 57 is
153 Contrast this figure to the approximately $640 billion in foreign
exchange transactions that are settled each day. See Brady, supra note 134,
at 26.
4 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 50.
15 See Becketti, supra note 62, at 37.
156 See id. at 37.
5 The tendency for derivatives to be used for arbitrage strengthens
linkages between markets, and increases the possibility that disruptions
may spill over into other markets and countries.
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heightened by the fact that a large portion of swap activities
are concentrated in a handful of large banks.
Nevertheless, ISDA notes that although the top eight
dealers accounted for 58% of interest rate and currency swaps
at year-end 1991, no single firm had over 10% of the
market. 58  In addition, despite the fact that the swap
market is relatively concentrated, the 250 or so ISDA dealers
comprising the majority of the market is large in comparison
to the much smaller number of dealers allowed to transact in
the government bond market.'59 Last, the ability of the
financial markets to survive a major disruption was evidenced
by its handling of the recent Barings PLC failure (as a result
of extreme losses from exchange traded derivatives) and the
Orange County investment fund debacle (which involved
extreme losses resulting from the use of highly leveraged
derivatives contracts).
Whether or not the previously discussed risks have the
potential to undermine the global financial system will be a
function of the magnitude of the risks, the management of the
risks by those transacting in the swap market, the liquidity of
the market, and the ability of regulators to set sensible and
prudent regulations which safeguard against the possibility of
a systemic catastrophe.
4. SWAPS AND CAPITAL
Ideally, Basle's provisions should reflect the foregoing
normative assessment of swap risks. While the Basle Accord
represents an important step towards creating a safer and
more competitive world banking system, its treatment of
swaps has been heavily criticized.
4.1. Basle's Treatment of Swap Credit Risk
4.1.1. Basle's Treatment of Swaps Under the 1988 Accord
Recognizing that a swap's credit risk is not equal to its
notional value, Basle incorporates swaps into its risk-based
capital approach by first converting them to "credit risk
15 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 61.
159 See id.
1995]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
equivalents," and then risk-weighting them according to the
obligor of the swap. Basle allows two alternative methods for
computing these credit risk equivalents: the current exposure
method and the original exposure method.
Under the current exposure method-the preferred and
recommended method-the credit risk equivalent is the sum
of two components. Banks are first required to calculate the
sum of the current replacement cost of all swap contracts with
positive value by marking them to market." Then, in order
to reflect the potential future exposure over the remaining life
of the contract, an "add-on" factor is added to the current
replacement cost by multiplying the notional principal amount
of each swap by the weights in Table 3 (depending on the type
of contract).1
6 1
The second method, which may be used at the discretion of
national supervisory authorities, is the original exposure
method.6 2 Because there is no separate assessment of
current and potential exposure, this method does not require
that instruments be marked to market. Instead, the potential
credit exposure is estimated by allocating a particular weight
to the notional amount of each contract based on the type of
contract and the original maturity, irrespective of what the
market value of the contract might be on a particular
date.' Accordingly, a slightly more cautious view is
justified, since the current exposure is not being calculated on
a regular basis."
160 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 154.
161 See BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASLE CAPITAL
ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET
ITEMS (1995) annex at 2 [hereinafter 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT]. Under
this method, no potential credit exposure is calculated for single currency
basis swaps. See BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 154. Prior to the
amendment of the accord in April 1995, the matrix in Table 3 did not
contain add-on factors to account for equity, precious metal and commodity
swaps.
162 Although national authorities may permit banks to choose which
method to adopt, once a bank has chosen the current exposure method, it is
not allowed to switch to the original exposure method. See id. annex at 3
n.3.
163 See id. "For interest rate contracts, there is national discretion as to
whether the conversion factors are to be based on original or residual
maturity." Id. at n.5.
1,4 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 154.
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Table 3: Conversion Factors
Current Exposure Method.'
for Potential Exposure: The
Table 4: Conversion Fa
Method. 6'
Maturity
One year or less
Over one year to two years












The value obtained, using either of these two methods, is
then risk-weighted by a factor reflecting the credit quality of
the counterparty, in the same manner as in the main
"9 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 161, annex at 2.
166 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 161, annex at 3. The original
exposure method may only be used for interest rate, exchange rate and gold
swaps. In addition, this method will cease to be available once the market
risk capital requirements are implemented. Id.
Ex- Preci-
change ous Other
Inte- Rate Metals Corn-
Residual rest and (except modi-
Maturity Rate Gold Equity gold) ties
One 0.0% 1.0% 6.0% 7.0% 10.0%
year or
less
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framework. Nevertheless, because most swap counterparties
tend to have a high credit rating, swaps with a commercial
counterparty, which would otherwise receive a 100% risk
weight, are weighted at 50%. A summary of the four levels of
risk-weighting appears in Table 5. The weights appearing in
Tables 3, 4 and 5 are not permanent, and will be adjusted by
Basle if circumstances dictate." Table 6 below provides
examples of credit equivalent computations under these two
methods.
Table 5: Risk Weights for Swaps.
Risk Weight Application
0% Central Governments of the OECD countries.
National supervisors may assign to 10% category
for maturities greater than one year.
10% Certain public sector entities located in the same
country as the bank.
20% Banks incorporated in OECD countries.
Multilateral development banks such as the
World Bank. Those outside the OECD if less
than one year.
50% All other counte'rparties, including corporate
users, non-bank financial institutions and banks
incorporated outside OECD.
1" For example, the conversion factors for calculating the credit exposure
are subject to amendment as a result of changes in the volatility of interest
rates and exchange rates. See BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 154.
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Table 6: Sample Credit Equivalents for Swaps Under Basle.
Potential Credit Credit
Exposure Equivalent Equivalent
Years Mark (Current (Current (Original
Re- to Exposure Exposure Exposure
Initial main- Market Method) Method) Method)
Swap ing Value le8 169 170




















Regardless of which method was used, risk-based capital
was, until recently, assessed on the gross exposure, or the sum
of all risk-weighted credit equivalents. In other words, except
16 Calculated by multiplying the notional amount by the factors in Table
3.
16 Equals the sum of (1) the swap's mark-to-market value, if positive
(zero if negative) and (2) the potential exposure.
170 Calculated by multiplying the notional amount by the factors in Table
4 corresponding to original maturities.
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for swaps netted by "novation,"'7 ' the 1988 Accord did not
recognize a reduction in capital adequacy requirements for
netting agreements with a particular counterparty.'" At the
time, the Committee felt it was unclear whether close-out
netting provisions would be legally enforceable.'
Primarily, the Committee was concerned that a trustee in
bankruptcy could unbundle the individual obligations under
the netted contracts, 4 defaulting on those which were "out
of the money" and requiring performance of those "in the
money." Because a novated contract substitutes for and
legally extinguishes all prior obligations, the Committee was
less concerned about the legality of netting by novation.
Basle's refusal to recognize netting in its framework was one
of the main criticisms of the 1988 accord.7 5
4.1.2. Basle Bilateral Netting Amendments
Although it took years longer than the industry would have
liked, Basle finally amended the accord in July 1994 and April
1995 to recognize bilateral netting for capital adequacy
purposes. 76 The July 1994 amendment (based on a proposal
put forth in April 1993) implemented netting for current
exposures, while the April 1995 amendment (based on a
proposal put forth in July 1994) implemented netting for
potential exposures. Bilateral netting for capital purposes,
171 Novation involves the formation of a new contract each time a new
swap transaction is consummated with a particular counterparty which
incorporates and amalgamates all prior commitments and obligations
between the two parties, displacing and terminating all prior agreements.
It is a form of payment netting whereby two or more transactions in the
same currency and with common payment dates are deemed terminated and
replaced with a new contract, requiring payments equal to the net difference
of the payments of the novated transactions. See BIS ACCORD, supra note
3, at 155 n.6.
172 See id. at 155.
1 See supra Section 3.4.2.; see also BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 155
(discussing the Committee's concerns with such enforceability).
14 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 155.
175 See New Proposals on Netting and Supervisory Treatment of Risk,
FIN. REG. REP., May 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
17 1 See BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE TREATMENT OF
THE CREDIT RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN OFF-BALANCE SHEET ITEMS 1
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however, will only be allowed if the following conditions are
met.
First, there must be a netting contract or agreement
creating a single legal obligation such that, in the event of a
default, bankruptcy, or liquidation, the bank would have an
obligation to receive or pay only the net sum of unrealized
gains and losses on the covered transactions. 7 ' Master
agreements, such as those promulgated by ISDA, would satisfy
this requirement. Second, there must be a written and
reasoned legal opinion that supports the validity of netting
under the laws of each concerned jurisdiction: (i) the
jurisdiction where the counterparty is chartered and, if a
foreign branch of a counterparty is involved, where such
branch is located; (ii) the law that governs the individual
transactions; and (iii) the law that governs the netting
agreement.""8 Third, procedures must be in place to "ensure
that the legal characteristics of netting arrangements are
[constantly] under review in light of possible changes in
relevant law." 9
These requirements are intended to address Basle's
concern "that if a liquidator of a failed counterparty has (or
may have) the right to unbundle netted contracts, demanding
performance on those contracts favourable to the failed
counterparty and defaulting on unfavourable contracts, there
is no reduction in counterparty risk."' 0  Netting is a
contractual provision similar to the common law doctrine of
set-off, pursuant to which a creditor is relieved from making
payments to a bankrupt debtor to the extent it can set-off
other obligations owed to it from the debtor.' Set-off is not
universally recognized, however, and there is a concern that a
'7 See 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 176, annex 1 at 1-2.
178 See id. annex 1 at 2.
17 Id Swaps netted by novation can also be netted for capital purposes.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
,s 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 176, annex 1 at 1.
181 The classic example of set-off is the case of Borrower who defaults on
a loan from Bank, but also has funds in a checking account at Bank. In
those jurisdictions which allow set-off, Bank would be entitled to seize the
funds in Borrower's checking account by setting it off against Borrower's
liability on the loan. If set-off were not applicable, Bank would be unable
to seize the checking account, and would be forced to file a claim in
bankruptcy for the entire amount of the loan.
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country's statutory or common law bankruptcy provisions
would allow a trustee to disregard the contractual netting
provisions, and to treat the netted transactions as individual
and separate contracts.182  Since in many countries the
bankruptcy trustee has the power to accept or reject executory
contracts, it would accept swaps that are in the money,
requiring the non-defaulting counterparty to continue
payments, yet would reject any out of the money contracts,
forcing the non-defaulting party to file a bankruptcy claim for
the swap's value. There is also a concern that bankruptcy
laws could impede the termination of swaps provided for by
most swap agreements in the event of insolvency, bankruptcy
or liquidation."
A further condition set forth by Basle is that swaps subject
to a netting agreement containing a "limited two-way
payment" clause may not be netted for capital adequacy
purposes.' This type of arrangement, otherwise referred to
as a "walkaway clause," provides that the defaulting party will
not be entitled to receive a net termination payment that is in
its favor. Such clauses, more common in older master
agreements, were intended to discourage default by providing
a windfall to the non-defaulting party and to compensate the
non-defaulting party for any limits resulting from inadequate
set-off laws. Basle's rationale, from a regulatory standpoint,
is a disaffection with depriving insolvent financial institutions
of important assets. Some also believe walkaway clauses
increase the legal uncertainty of netting because bankruptcy
courts generally look unfavorably upon this type of
"forfeiture."'"
182 See id.
183 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 47. For example, prior to the
1990 amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, it was believed that
termination rights under master agreements would be subject to the
automatic stay, thus delaying the ability to terminate the master agreement
and enforce the close-out netting provisions. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(55)(c),
362(b)(14), 546(g), 548(d)(2)(D), 560 (Supp. V 1993); See Given, supra note
150.
'8 See 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 176, annex 2 at 2.
18' Often, counterparties to defaulted swaps choose not to exercise their
right to walk away under the limited two-way payment clause. See Brady,
supra note 134, at 28 (quoting an ISDA member's observation that
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Despite Basle's concerns, the United States, Canada,
Germany, France, and Belgium all have passed legislation that
reduces the legal uncertainty of a swap's treatment in
bankruptcy by specifically allowing netting, and by validating
terminati n provisions.1" In addition, in its 1990 report, the
Lamfalussy Committee on Interbank Netting concluded that
bilateral master agreements and other bilateral netting by
novation are likely to be enforceable in all countries where the
1988 accord is in effect."8 7 Moreover, ISDA has obtained
legal opinions from counsel in the G-10 countries, Australia,
the Cayman Islands, Denmark, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand
to the effect that netting provisions contained in ISDA's
master agreements were likely to be upheld. Finally, there
has yet to be a case in which netting was invalidated, and such
arrangements were successful in the unwinding of Drexel and
Development Finance Corp.1" Because there have been few
defaults," and most have been settled out of court, netting
agreements have yet to be tested in a hostile environment.
If all of the foregoing conditions are met, the credit
equivalent computation under the current exposure method
will be based on the net current exposure (ie. the net mark-to-
market replacement cost) with each counterparty, rather than
the gross exposure.'19 Basle initially rejected arguments by
ISDA and others that the add-ons should also be based on net
rather than gross notional principal amounts. In July 1994,
however, they put forth a proposal to amend the treatment of
add-ons, and in April 1995 they adopted a modified version of
such proposal into the accord, which is due to become effective
by the end of 1995.91 Once such provision is effective, the
188 See Behof, supra note 87, at 25-26.
137 See id. at 25.
18 See Tracy Corrigan, Risk and Reward: Growing Concern Over the
Dangers of Counterparty Credit, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at 21.
183 See Behof, supra note 87, at 26.
I' See 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 176, at 2. For the original
exposure method, a reduction in credit conversion factors of approximately
25% would be allowed during the transitional period until the market risk
capital requirements are implemented at which time the original exposure
method will cease to be available. 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note
161, annex at 6.
191 See 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 161, at 1.
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accord will allow banks using the current exposure method to
reduce the add-ons of transactions meeting the foregoing legal
requirements by having an add-on equal to the following:
Add-onnet = .4 * Add-ongross + .6 * NGR * Add-ongro1 92
where:
NGR = the level of net replacement cost/level of gross
replacement cost for transactions subject to legally
enforceable netting agreements.
Add-ongro,8 = the sum of individual add-ons calculated by
multiplying notional amounts by the factors in Table 3
above.
Under this formula, the add-on for netted transactions equals
a weighted average of the gross add-on and the gross add-on
adjusted by the NGR."9 ' If netting reduces the current
exposure by 50%, the reduction in add-ons for potential
exposure would be 30%. According to Basle:
The advantage of the formula from a supervisory persp-
ective is that it uses bank-specific information (i.e. the
NGR) but imposes greater stability over time and
across banks than a formula giving full weight to the
NGR. Moreover, using this formula banks will always
hold capital against potential exposure as the net add-
on can never be zero.1 4
The 1994 proposal suggested that the NGR be weighted by
.5 (instead of .6) in the formula above. In the 1995
amendment, however, the weight was increased to .6 in
response to those who argued that the .5 weight would
192 Id. annex at 5.
193 Id
194 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra note 176, at 3. The reason for
using a weighted average approach such as that utilized by Basle, rather
than giving full effect to the NGR, is that there is not an empirical linear
relationship between reductions in current exposure and reductions in
potential exposure. In other words, if the effect of netting with a count-
erparty happens to reduce the current exposure at a given point in time to
zero, it does not mean that this exposure will remain zero over time.
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significantly understate the reduction in potential exposure
resulting from bilateral netting.19 The current weighting
formula "represents an appropriate compromise between
recognising the effects of netting in the add-ons and providing
a cushion against potential fluctuations in the net current
exposure."' National authorities may allow their banks to
calculate NGR on a counterparty by counterparty or on an
aggregate basis for all transactions meeting the foregoing
criteria, so long as the institution calculates NGR on a
consistent basis. 19
4.1.3. Criticism of Basle's Treatment of Credit Risk
There are several possible criticisms of Basle's treatment
of swap credit risk. First, as discussed previously, the risk
weights applied to the swap credit exposure are very crude.
While Basle has been applauded for risk-weighting the credit
equivalent of swaps with private counterparties at 50% rather
than 100%, recognizing the fact that swap counterparties tend
to have investment grade credit ratings, there is no pretending
that this figure is an accurate assessment of default
probabilities. This inaccuracy becomes evident through an
examination of the volume of actual defaults and by the fact
that the weighting does not vary according to the specific
credit characteristics of each counterparty. Moreover, Basle's
approach assumes that the probability of default is constant
throughout the life of the swap. In reality, the default
probability will vary over the swap's life and may depend on
changes in the underlying swap rates.19 Since most swap
counterparties are investment grade, there is less of a
likelihood that there will be a default early in the swap's
life. 99 In addition, Basle fails to take account of whether a
196 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT, supra not 161, at 1.196 Id
197 Id. annex at 5 n.10. Under the aggregate approach, however, net
negative current exposures cannot be used to offset net positive exposures
from other counterparties. Id.
198 See supra Section 3.2.4.
199 See HENDERSON AND PRICE, supra note 38, at 77 (providing figures
suggesting that it is reasonable to assume that a party will not default on
a swap within the first 2 years).
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bank's swap portfolio is diversified across various
counterparties and industries.
The calculation of a swap's credit exposure also has been
criticized heavily. The original exposure method is inadequate
because it does not reflect changes in the market value of the
swap, and because it assigns the same capital requirement
throughout a swap's life, despite evidence that exposures
change dramatically over the life of a swap.200 "This original
exposure approach to calculating credit equivalents will often
generate numbers bearing only the most tenuous relationship
to the true credit exposure on any individual swap."0 1 The
only justification for this approach is that the method provides
estimates strong enough for regulatory purposes when applied
to a swap portfolio in the aggregate.20 2 Its simplicity is its
virtue, which is why the "less sophisticated" members of Basle
required its inclusion in the accord as an alternative to the
current exposure method. This method is unsuitable in a
netting environment, and many believe its use should be
completely abandoned.2 3  From a regulatory perspective
there is less concern about its inaccuracies because this
method will likely overestimate the capital requirement, and
because most major dealers use the current exposure
method.2 O'
Another criticism of Basle's calculation of credit exposures
is that the factors for measuring potential exposure, under
either method, do not reflect the fact that different interest
rates and exchange rates have different volatilities and
correlations. For example, all cross-currency swaps have the
same coefficient applied to the notional amount. Certain
currencies, however, are more highly correlated than others:
the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar are more highly
200 See infra Figures 3 and 4.
201 Hu, supra note 8, at 387.
202 See id.
203 See BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE SUPERVISORY
RECOGNITION OF NETTING FOR CAPITAL ADEQUACY PURPOSES 5 (1993).
204 See id. at 3. In addition, the original exposure method will cease to
be an option once the market risk capital requirements discussed infra are
implemented. See supra note 166.
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correlated than the U.S. dollar and the Swiss franc."
Similarly, different interest rates have different volatilities.
The general accuracy of the potential exposure weights has
also been questioned. It is believed that the add-on weights
instituted by Basle were developed by conducting various
simulation exercises akin to those discussed supra Section
3.2.2'0 Nonetheless, Basle has not outlined its methodology.
It is believed that the factors for the original exposure method
rely on maximum exposures and confidence intervals between
70% and 90%,20 but it is unclear how Basle arrived at the
add-ons under the current exposure method. Although the
add-on is intended to reflect the potential exposure over the
remaining life of the swap, the add-on is largely independent
of the residual life of the contract.0 8 In addition, it is
arguable that the add-on should instead reflect the potential
exposure over some shorter period, reflecting the fact that the
swap is periodically marked to market."s
There is also no empirical justification for the large
differences which exist between the factors for interest rate
swaps and those for currency swaps. Although exchange rates
are more volatile, they are not, as the add-ons indicate, ten
times more volatile. The inaccuracies of the interest rate swap
add-ons, for example, become evident when Basle's conversion
factors for potential exposure are compared to those which
Simons computed in the study discussed supra Section 3.2.4.
The methods also fail to consider different potential exposures
for non-par swaps. 10
20 See Hu, supra note 8, at 396. Yet under the original exposure, a
Swiss franc/U.S. dollar swap and a U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar swap require
the same capital. This result improves under the current exposure method
because differences in the mark-to-market value will reflect differences in
volatility and correlation, but the add-on factor will be identical for both
swaps.
206 See Simons, supra note 92, at 24; see also Giberti et al., supra note
108, at 28.
20 See Giberti, et al., supra note 108, at 28.
20 Under the current exposure method, Basle only distinguishes between
those contracts one year and less, those over one year and less than five
years, and those greater than five years. See supra Table 3 and Table 4.
20 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
210 See Giberti et al., supra note 108, at 27; see also supra note 31
(discussing the differences between par and non-par swaps).
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Although the Committee should be commended for finally
amending the accord in April 1995 to expand the potential
exposure matrix to account for equity and commodity swaps,
it is unclear how they arrived at the promulgated factors and
whether the factors bear any relation to the potential credit
risks posed by these instruments. It is doubtful, for example,
that there is a firm empirical basis to support the magnitude
of the add-ons assessed on "other commodities" and equity
swaps. If the add-ons are inaccurate, they could counteract
the recent proliferation of these innovative and beneficial types
of swaps.
In addition, summing potential exposures dramatically
overstates the actual exposure because it fails to account for
offsetting exposures or the fact that different swaps will have
peak potential exposures at different times.2 "' For example,
assume that an intermediary has two offsetting, but otherwise
identical, swaps with a counterparty. If the total maximum
exposure for a certain confidence interval is $2 million for each
swap, then a system which sums the potential exposure would
severely overestimate the potential loss at $4 million because
both of these swaps cannot be in the money at the same time.
The proper exposure is really $2 million, if netting does not
apply, and $0, if it does apply.
2 12
A similar problem occurs because of the mismatch in the
timing of maximum exposures. As Figure 3 indicates, the
timing of the peak exposure for swaps varies with their
maturities. If maximum exposures are summed and the
timing of peak exposures for each swap varies, then there is an
overstatement of potential exposure because a default cannot
simultaneously occur at the maximum exposure point for every
swap. It is inappropriate to add the peak exposures of.
transactions that have different residual maturities.2 "13 These
criticisms highlight the importance of analyzing exposure by
using a simulation analysis of an entire portfolio, because it is
the only way to directly measure the complex portfolio effects.
Until recently, the greatest criticism of Basle has been its
reliance on gross exposures for capital purposes despite the
211 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 14.
212 See G-30 APPENDIX, supra note 90, at 22.
213 See id. at 23.
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proliferation of netting agreements. The amendments to the
accord in July 1994 and April 1995 largely respond to these
criticisms. It is unclear, however, whether the weighted
approach used to calculate the add-on for netted transactions
has an empirical basis. In addition, ISDA has criticized
Basle's prohibition of walkaway clauses for netting purposes,
and believes, based on legal opinions obtained from 23
jurisdictions, that whether a non-defaulting party is required
to make a net payment to a defaulting party is a separate and
distinct issue from whether the termination and bilateral
close-out provisions are enforceable.2 14
Since legal certainty exists in many jurisdictions for
collateral arrangements, it is also vital that Basle implement
standard provisions to recognize the reduction of credit risk
afforded by the use of swap collateral. This would provide
recognition to the economic function which collateral serves,
and would encourage and reward the use of collateral for risk
mitigation.
Finally, Basle should allow banks to use their own internal
proprietary models to measure credit risk for capital purposes
(subject to certain parameters instituted by Basle). Although
Basle recently proposed such an alternative models-based
approach for assessing market risks, as will be discussed infra
Section 4.2.2., Basle has yet to expand this concept to credit
risk calculations. Since changes in swap market values are in
fact a determinant of credit risk, there is no reason why Basle
should recognize such models for the former but not for the
latter.
4.2. Basle's Proposed Treatment of Market Risk
Basle's current capital regime applies solely to credit risks,
and was not intended to reflect an assessment of market or
other risks. Nevertheless, in recognition of banks' increasing
involvement in areas of foreign exchange, securities trading,
214 See Letter from Joseph Bauman, Chairman of ISDA, to Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision 10 (Dec. 28, 1993)(on file with author)
at 7. In the case of Drexel Burnham Lambert Products Corp. v. Midland
Bank, PLC, Judge Pollack of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York affirmed the validity of the walkaway clause
as a valid liquidated damages clause. See 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21223, at
2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1992), appeal dismissed per stipulation.
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and derivatives, the accord was consummated with the
understanding that market risk would eventually be
incorporated into the capital framework. In April of 1993,
Basle introduced two new proposals aimed at incorporating
market risks into the Accord. One proposal applies to the
market risks of a bank's trading book (i.e. market risks on the
banking book are not taken into account), 1 ' while the other
applies to the interest rate risk of a bank as a whole. In April
of 1995, Basle introduced a revised market risk proposal, with
the anticipation that it would become effective by year-
end.21  National supervisors would have until 1997 to
implement its specific provisions.2"7
4.2.1. 1993 and 1995 Market Risk Proposals
The objective of the initial market risk proposal was to
develop a framework for capital charges which would consti-
tute a minimum prudential standard relative to the potential
for losses that might be incurred for a given portfolio of debt,
equity, or foreign exchange.218  Ideally, this framework
would ensure that artificial incentives were not created to
favor one class of instruments over another. 19 The 1993
Market Risk Proposal segmented market risks into three
categories, foreign exchange risk, equities risk and debt
securities risk, and provided a standardized methodology for
calculating the capital to be set aside for each of these risks.
The major substantive revisions made by the 1995 amended
2 15A bank's trading book represents an institution's proprietary positions
in financial instruments, which are taken on primarily with the intention
of profiting from short-term price movements or which are intentionallyheld
for short-term resale. This includes instruments that are used to hedge
other elements of the trading book. BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PLANNED SUPPLEMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO
INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 MARKET RISK
PROPOSAL]. The trading book is to be distinguished from the "banking
book," which represents a bank's core business of making loans and other




"" See BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE SUPERVISORY





SWAPS, BANKS, AND CAPITAL
proposal include the addition of market risk capital re-
quirements for commodities and options, and the possible use
of proprietary in-house models for measuring market risks as
an alternative to the standardized measurement framework
previously articulated in the 1993 proposal.22
If the 1995 amended proposal is implemented, two broad
methodologies will be permitted in measuring market risks.
Under either method, capital would be assessed on the mark-
to-market value of the instruments in question, and the capital
charge for market risk would be a substitute for such
instrument's credit risk capital charge (except for OTC
derivatives, which will generate both a credit risk and market
risk capital assessment, whether on the banking book or the
trading book). Under the standardized framework, market
risk capital would be assessed as follows.
Under the amended proposal, the capital required for
foreign exchange risk is determined by first calculating the
bank's net position in each currency by subtracting the
nominal amount (or net present value) of all liabilities in that
currency from all assets.22' Next, the bank determines its
total net open position by first converting all currency
positions into the reporting currency at spot rates, and then
taking the greater of the sum of the short positions or the sum
of the long positions. The capital requirement would be 8% of
this net open position.222
220 The 1993 and 1995 proposals are highly technical and complex, and
therefore the following discussion is merely intended to summarize its main
aspects. For a more complete summary of the 1993 proposal, see Robert
Bergqvist and Mats Ericsson, Capital Adequacy Rules for Market Risks,
RIKSBANK Q. REV., 3rd Quarter, 1993, at 5; HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A.
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION (1995) chapter 16. See also 1993 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL,
supra note 218; 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215. For a
summary of the main differences between the 1993 and 1995 market risk
proposals, see BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND SUPERVISION, PROPOSAL
TO ISSUE A SUPPLEMENT TO THE BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD TO COVER MARKET
RISKS (1995) [hereinafter 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT].
2 See Bergqvist & Ericsson, supra note 220, at 7. Forward obligations
to receive or pay currencies, including the principal on currency swaps, are
included in this net figure.
2 For example, the bank calculates the net position in each currency,
and then converts each position into the reporting currency (e.g., dollars).
Assume that after this is done the bank has the following exposures: Yen
+50, DM +100, SF + 150, FFR -20, GB£ -180. The capital charge would be
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The capital requirement for equity positions is based upon
a "building block approach," which differentiates between
requirements for specific risk and those for general market
risk. The former is the risk of loss caused by adverse price
movements as a result of issuer-specific factors, while the
latter is the risk of loss caused by broad market movements as
a result of changes in general economic conditions that affect
the equity market as a whole. The charge for general risk is
proposed to be 8% of a bank's net open position in all
equities.'23 The charge for specific risk will be a function of
portfolio diversity and will be assessed on the sum, rather
than the net," of all long and short positions.
25
The proposed capital requirement for debt securities is also
segmented into separate charges for specific risk and general
risk. The specific risk charge is intended to protect against
possible price changes of an individual security, and is
dependent upon the residual maturity and the obligor of each
instrument.22 1 The measure of general market risk is
intended to capture the risk of loss arising from changes in
8% of the higher of the longs (300) and the shorts (200) = 300 x 8% = 24.
This method assumes some, but not perfect, correlation between movements
of different exchange rates. See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note
215, at 24.
2 The net position is the difference between the sum of the bank's long
positions in all equities and the sum of its short positions. A separate
calculation must be carried out for each national market in which the bank
holds equities. Id. at 19.
224 However, long and short positions for the same issuer may be netted.
225 Poorly diversified portfolios would be charged 8% of the sum total,
highly diversified and liquid portfolios 4%, and diversified equity index
products 2%. See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 19.
Each country must determine its own definitional criteria as to what
constitutes a liquid and well diversified portfolio. Id.
2 The specific risk charge for debt securities is as follows:
Government Securities 0.00%
Qualifying securities with residual maturity:




See id. at 9. Qualifying securities include those issued by public sector
entities, multilateral development banks, and securities which are rated
investment grade by at least two credit rating agencies. A specific risk
charge higher than 8% will be assessed against high-yield debt securities
according to national supervisory discretion. Id. at 10.
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market interest rates, and two methods have been proposed:
the "maturity" method227 and the "duration" method.28
Under the maturity method, long and short positions in
debt securities and debt related derivatives are slotted into
maturity bands (depending on the residual maturity and
coupon rate), each with a predetermined risk weight
corresponding to the perceived price sensitivity229  of
instruments within each band. Fixed-rate instruments are
allocated among the maturity bands according to the residual
term to maturity, and floating-rate instruments are allocated
according to the next repricing date.210 These risk weights
vary from 0% to 12.50%. The first step in calculating the
capital charge is to weight the positions in each time band by
the appropriate factor. The next step is to offset the weighted
longs and shorts in each band, arriving at a net open position
for each band. The total net open position is calculated by
netting these positions across all the bands. Because within
each time-band there are instruments of various durations,
however, a "vertical disallowance" will be added to the total
net open position.231 A "horizontal disallowance" will also be
227 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 11.
28 See id. at 13.
2" The price sensitivity of debt instruments is generally a function of an
instrument's duration and volatility. Duration is a financial concept which
quantifies the percentage change in an asset's value for a given percentage
change in interest rates. An asset with a longer duration has a greater
exposure to changes in interest rates. Duration is the measure of the
average maturity of the stream of payments associated with an instrument,
and should not be confused with nominal maturity. For example, a 30 year
coupon-paying bond does not have a duration of 30 years because interest
payments on the bond are paid periodically throughout its life, which are in
a sense mini-repayments. The greater the intervening payments are prior
to the stated maturity (ie. the higher the coupon rate), the lower the
duration of an instrument will be.
230 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, note 215, at 11. For example, a
floating rate based on six month LIBOR would reprice every six months.
23' Since within each band there are securities whose price sensitivities
are not identical, it is proposed that there be a 10% vertical disallowance
(applied to the smaller of the long or short positions) within each time-band.
See id. at 11. For example, if the sum of the weighted longs in a time-band
is $100 million and the sum of the weighted shorts is $90 million, the
vertical disallowance would be 10% of $90 million. See id. The disallowance
takes into account the fact that prices of long and short positions with the
same maturity do not necessarily co-vary. See Bergqvist & Ericsson, supra
note 220, at 11.
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added to reflect the fact that movements in short-term rates
are not exactly correlated to movements in long-term
rates.232 It should be noted that separate reporting ladders
are used for each currency. As an alternative to the maturity
method, it is proposed that those institutions capable of
measuring duration more accurately could, with their
supervisors' consent, use their own internal models to
calculate separately the price sensitivity of each
instrument.3 3
As an alternative to the standardized method just dis-
cussed, the 1995 Market Risk Proposal sets forth a models-
based approach to market risk capital requirements which
could be utilized subject to the approval of supervisory
authorities and subject to meeting certain qualitative and
quantitative standards.
Required qualitative standards include the establishment
of an independent risk control unit with active involvement of
senior management; integration of the model into day-to-day
risk management; regular stress testing and back-testing of
the model; the establishment of a routine for insuring
compliance; and an independent review of risk management
and measurement at regular intervals.2 " In addition, cer-
tain other procedures are proscribed. For the quantitative
standards, the measure of a bank's market risk exposure,
typically expressed in terms of "value at risk," should be
232 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 12. By allowing
positions among the different bands to net each other, the calculation of the
total net open position implicitly assumes that changes in long-term rates
correspond to changes in short-term rates. The horizontal offset is intended
to provide for the fact that changes in such rates are not exactly correlated.
Horizontal offsetting, a very technical process, is outside the scope of this
paper. For a complete explanation and sample calculation, see id. at 12 and
50.
2 See id. at 13. The sensitivity measures would be slotted into duration
based time bands with a modified measurement of vertical and horizontal
disallowances. These institutions must demonstrate that their use of the
duration method produces results that are consistently equivalent to those
produced by the maturity method. The reader is referred to Basle's proposal
for a discussion of the treatment of commodities and options as a brief
summary here would not be meaningful. See i&L at 26-37.
23 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT, supra note 220, at 3. Stress testing
involves running a model with extremely volatile data, perhaps
corresponding to an aberrational historical period. Back-testing involves an
ex post assessment of a model's determination of potential market risk.
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computed daily using a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence
interval. The minimum holding period should be ten trading
days and the historical observation period for the data used in
the model should be at least one year.235 A separate model
must be used for each risk category described above, and the
value at risk across the broad categories will be aggregated on
a simple sum basis." 6 Supervisors may insist on a period of
monitoring and testing of a bank's model before it is used for
supervisory capital purposes.""
Using a models-based approach, the capital charge will be
the greater of (1) the previous day's -value at risk as calculated
by the model, or (2) an average of such calculation over the
preceding 60 business days, multiplied by a factor based on the
individual supervisor's assessment of the quality of each
bank's risk management system (subject to a minimum of
three).3 ' In addition, a "plus" will be added to the
multiplication factor depending on the ex-post performance of
the model, providing a built-in incentive to maintain model
accuracy."' Banks using this models-based approach will be
subject to a separate charge to cover specific risk of traded
debt and equity securities to the extent this risk is not already
incorporated into the applicable model. 4 ' A model's
accuracy will also be subject to validation by external auditors
and/or supervisors. It is expected that the banks who opt for
a models-based approach will utilize models for all categories
235 Ia The holding period is the period over which potential price
changes are measured. Many banks internally use a one day holding period
for the measurement of potential changes in position value. BASLE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AN INTERNAL MODEL-BASED
APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 10 (1995). Such a short
period is reasonable where trading managers can make day-to-day decisions
to adjust risk. Id. A longer holding period reflects the possibility that
markets may become illiquid, preventing the market participants from
closing out positions quickly. Id.
" Id. In other words, inter-correlation and offsetting of market risks
among product types are ignored.
237 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 38.
2, 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT, supra note 220, at 3-4. Only those
banks which satisfy all the qualitative criteria will be eligible for the
minimum multiplication factor. 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note
215, at 39.
2n 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT, supra note 220, at 3-4.
24 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 45.
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of risks and, after a transitional period, will not be allowed to
combine a models approach for some market risks with a
standardized approach for others.
Because market risks tend to be more volatile than bank
credit risks, the committee proposed a broader definition of
capital by designating a third capital tier to include certain
additional forms of subordinated debt. This subordinated debt
may be used to cover capital requirements for market risk,
subject to certain limitations.241
If the market risk proposal were implemented, the bank's
overall minimum capital requirement would be the sum of: (1)
the existing credit risk requirements for the banking business,
such as loans and investments considered part of the banking
book and for OTC derivatives whether part of the trading book
or banking book; (2) the proposed capital charge for debt and
equity securities, commodities, options and derivatives in the
trading portfolio; and (3) the proposed capital charge for
foreign exchange risk. Since the proposed market risk charges
for debt and equity securities in the trading book would
substitute for the credit risks currently applied to these assets,
it is unclear whether, after implementation of this proposal,
the capital requirements would be higher or lower than those
to which banks are presently subjected.24
In addition to the market risk proposal, which is meant to
primarily address market risks on a bank's trading book, in
April 1993 Basle proposed a common approach to measuring
the interest rate exposure of a bank as a whole, in order to
roughly determine changes in net worth for a specified change
in interest rates. However, because interest rate mismatching
is a normal feature of the banking business, and because the
existing and proposed capital requirements cover a certain
241 See id. at 7; see also BIS ACCORD, supra note 3, at 145 (noting that
capital is generally divided into two tiers).
242 See 1993 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 218, at 8. This will also
depend on the risk profile of the particular institution in question. It should
be noted that the specific risk component of the market risk charge for debt
and equity is essentially a credit risk component. This explains why the
market risk charge, when implemented, will replace the credit risk charge
for these instruments. This also explains why OTC derivatives on the
trading book will be treated under both the credit risk and market risk
capital regimes, as such instruments do not receive a specific risk charge
under the market risk proposals.
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amount of the interest rate risk to which banks are exposed,
Basle has not articulated a separate capital charge for overall
interest rate risk. The purpose of the proposal is to enable
banks to measure this risk, so that supervisors can identify
those assuming an excessive amount of interest rate risk on
the banking book. The supervisory response to these outliers
would be left to national discretion. Basle has indicated that
its priority at this point is to implement a market risk-based
capital regime, and it plans to return to the question of overall
interest rate risk at a later date.2"
4.2.2. Treatment of Swaps Under the Market Risk
Proposals
A swap's treatment under the market risk proposals
utilizing the standardized methodology depends on the
underlying swap variable. Interest rate swaps are
incorporated into the debt securities segment of market risk,
currency swaps are incorporated into the foreign exchange risk
regime, equity swaps are incorporated into the equity market
risk provisions, etc. Since interest rate and currency swaps
relate to an underlying variable not bearing an identifiable
specific risk, they will not be subjected to specific risk
charges. 44
Under the general market risk debt provisions, interest
rate swaps held as part of the trading book would be treated
as two notional positions in government securities with
relevant maturities.2 45  The market risk of these
"government securities" would then be determined under the
market risk regime for debt securities, as described above. For
example, a fixed-floating interest rate swap would be broken
down into a fixed bond and a floating-rate bond.246 If the
bank is the fixed-rate payer, it would treat the swap as a short
position in a government fixed-rate debt instrument of a
maturity equal to the residual maturity of the swap and a long
243 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT, supra note 220, at 7.
24 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 16; supra note
242 and accompanying text.
245 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 15.
246 Recall that swaps can be re-characterized as parallel loans. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
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position in a floating-rate instrument of maturity equal to the
period of the next repricing date. Institutions with large swap
books could use alternative methods of including their
positions into the maturity or duration ladders. 47
For an equity index swap, whereby the bank pays a fixed
rate against a certain index, the interest component would be
handled as discussed in the preceding paragraph, while the
equity component would be treated as a long position under
the equities framework. Pure equity swaps would be treated
as two notional equity positions. Separate legs of cross-
currency swaps would be reported in the relevant maturity
ladders for the currencies involved. 4 ' The principal of
currency swaps would be treated as long or short forward
positions in the relevant currencies.
As an alternative to the standardized methodology, swaps
could be incorporated into the models-based regime discussed
above. This could be accomplished by dissecting a swap into
its constituent parts and incorporating each part into the
model of the appropriate risk factor, or, presumably, by
modeling swaps as a whole similar to the methods outlined in
Section 3.2.4.
It is unclear how large a role the capital charge for swap
market risk will play. The charge would apply only to swaps
on the trading book. Presumably, most end-user banks which
use derivatives to hedge business risks on the banking book
would not characterize their swap positions as short-term
trading instruments. 4 ' Nevertheless, swap dealers would
presumably characterize their swaps as part of the trading
book, and would incur both a credit risk and market risk
capital charge against such positions.250
247 See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215, at 16.
248 See id. at 15.
24 See supra note 215 for a discussion of what constitutes a bank's
trading book.
215 However, closely matched swaps which meet certain conditions will
be allowed to fully offset one another, and therefore would not be subject to
the vertical disallowance. See 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, supra note 215,
at 16. This would apply if, for example, the reference rate for the floating-
rate positions is identical and/or the coupon for fixed-rate positions are
closely matched (i.e. within 10-15 basis points). Id.
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4.2.3. Criticism of Basle's Proposed Treatment of Market
Risk
Although a detailed analysis of the market risk proposals
is beyond the scope of this paper since the treatment of swaps
plays a minor role in the overall proposals, there are several
criticisms which can be made of Basle's overall treatment of
market risk.
Basle's treatment of market risk focuses on specific
products, rather than on underlying risk factors. Even the
new models-based approach forces banks to model according to
product type and does not allow for cross-correlations among
these products. ISDA, on the other hand, has recommended
merging potential changes in market rates and prices into
common denominators that transcend contract or product type,
such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity prices
and indexes, commodity prices, etc.25' These risk factors are
not the equivalent of measuring risk in terms of product type,
because more than one risk factor can affect the valuation of
a particular product.252 Since each product may include
several common denominators of risk, summing across
products rather than across risks will overstate the capital
requirement. Basle's proposed provisions will not account for
the fact that hedges to certain types of risk may exist across
different product types.253
The financial world is continually developing new products.
Basle's product approach is also problematic because it lacks
the flexibility necessary to deal with innovative products.
Assessing capital requirements for new instruments would
require a new policy from Basle for each new product, even if
251 See Letter from Joseph Bauman, Chairman of ISDA, to Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision 1 (Dec. 28, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter ISDA Market Risk Letter] at 4. Within each of these factors
there are also several sub-categories of risk which could be examined.
These include outright or parallel shift risk, term structure or yield curve
risk, basis or spread risk, volatility risk, and convexity risk.
252 See id.
25' For example, aside from affecting the value of debt securities, interest
rates will have a discernible effect on equity securities. A capital approach
which does not take account of these interrelationships will not assess the
proper amount of capital.
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the new product constitutes a simple rearrangement of
existing risk factors.2"
Prior to Basle's 1995 amendment to the market risk
proposal, the main criticism of the proposal was its
incompatibility with the intricate internal models developed by
most banks to manage their own market risks. Basle is
moving in the right direction with its models-based approach,
however, the constraints and parameters it has imposed on
such method will overestimate the risks and result in an over-
assessment of market risk capital. Basle has instituted a
number of conservative parameters, which, although arguably
defensible individually, are burdensome in the aggregate. For
example, despite the fact that Basle has mandated a very
conservative confidence interval of 99%, the market risk
estimated under the models will likely be subject to a
multiplication factor of at least 3.255 The required
assumption of a ten day holding period is also very
conservative, given the fact that instruments are marked to
market daily, and assumes that all instruments will be fairly
illiquid. Further, the aggregate value at risk is a simple sum
of the individual assessments of the various product types and
does not allow for any inter-correlation. This layering
amounts to overprotectiveness. One appeal of a models-based
approach is to provide an incentive for banks to develop
models which more accurately assess risk by rewarding them
with a more accurate capital assessment than under the
standardized methodology. It is clear that the current
proposal does not accomplish this objective.
Finally, it is essential that those bank end-users who
employ swaps to hedge interest rate, exchange rate, and other
risks are not penalized for doing so. Although Basle has
stated that market risk capital will not be assessed against
swaps utilized for this purpose, it is unclear how regulators
will be able to determine whether or not a bank is using a
swap to hedge risks or to augment them. A factor-based
approach would obviate the need for making such a
distinction.
' See ISDA Market Risk Letter, supra note 251, at 8. For example,
until 1995, the accord did not delineate capital requirements for commodity
swaps.
265 See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see supra Section 4.2.1.
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5. WHAT'S AT STAKE?
5.1. Do Banks and Regulators Understand the Product and
the Risks?
In light of the sheer size and complexity of the swap
market, many are concerned that neither regulators nor bank
management truly understand what swaps are or how to
control swap risks. There is a fear that the same industry
which brought us the LDC debt crisis and the real estate loan
debacle is unable to comprehend and effectively monitor swap
risk exposure, for "[i]n the early days of the swap market some
institutions did not even recognize swaps as having any credit
risk at all."256 This concern is heightened by the fact that
derivatives reduce the transparency of a bank's balance sheet,
thus making it difficult for the capital markets and for bank
regulators to monitor these institutions. While most
sophisticated dealers have developed intricate models to
understand and manage their swap exposure, there is still a
concern that these models will not prevail under stress.
Aside from the concern about the banks themselves, there
is also concern about the regulators. As the world of finance
becomes more arcane, complicated, abstract, and theoretical,
there is concern that regulators will be unable to keep pace.
Establishing capital requirements for swaps, enforcing the
requirements, and ensuring that banks have adequate risk
management requires a certain degree of sophistication.
Improperly assessed risk-based capital may potentially harm
banks, the financial system, and society as a whole.
5.2. What are the Concerns?
5.2.1. Bank Failure and Systemic Risks
A foremost concern is that imprudent management of swap
risks will cause bank failures, sending ripples throughout the
world financial system. If a large bank were to fail,
substantial disruptions in the global capital markets would
result. Paradoxically, the efficiencies in the global capital
markets which have been achieved over the last decade
256 Hu, supra note 4, at 1480.
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heighten this risk, because financial markets in different
countries are more connected than ever before. In fact,
derivatives have been a major contributor to the bridging of
disparate markets.
Derivatives such as swaps, however, do not introduce risks
of a fundamentally different kind, or of a greater scale, than
those which banks currently face from more traditional bank
activities.257  Derivatives dealers understand the risks
because it is their business to manage them. "Swap guys may
be clever characters, but [they] haven't been able to invent
new kinds of risks."25 ' Whether a bank makes a fixed-rate
loan or enters into an interest rate swap, it is subject to
interest rate risk. Similarly, when a bank enters into an oil
swap it is exposed to the same type of oil price risk as making
a loan to an oil producer.259
With respect to swaps, the greatest concern has been about
credit risk, yet a bank's expertise lies in its ability to make
such credit assessments. While swaps add some complexity in
calculating the amount at risk, the fundamental credit
analysis remains the same. Although notions of marking-to-
market would seem to be a concept more suitable for
investment banks than commercial banks, the banking
industry has undergone tremendous changes in the last decade
and the distinction between investment banks and commercial
banks is difficult to discern. In addition, banks are actively
working on ways to hedge these risks through bilateral
netting, collateralization, and marking-to-market.
Efficiencies in the capital markets have disintermediated
banks from lending to high credit quality borrowers who now
meet their financing needs in the securities markets.
Therefore, swaps have actually increased the average quality
and diversity of the credit risk to which banks are normally
exposed in their traditional lending activities. If banks do not
introduce innovative ways to offer services to these high
quality borrowers, then the quality of their assets will
continue to deteriorate.
257 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at i.
258 Hansell & Muehring, supra note 101, at 53 (quoting Mark Brickell,
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For those who still cannot envision banks performing
functions and inventing products which seem more appropriate
to investment banking, it is essential to realize that banks are
no strangers to OTC derivatives, which are more a part of a
bank's traditional business than one may realize. For
example, when a bank makes a pre-payable loan, such as a
mortgage loan, the bank is really selling a loan plus an option
contract; if interest rates fall, the option will be exercised and
the homeowner will refinance at lower prevailing interest
rates. Similarly, standby letters of credit, revolving credit
lines, and other guarantees are merely types of options. When
a bank makes a commitment to lend in the future at a
predetermined rate, it essentially has entered into a forward
contract.
Many who have sounded the alarm against swaps often get
their ammunition purely from the size and complexity of the
market. Nonetheless, the market is neither as large as the
numbers suggest, nor as complex as it appears. To put the
swap market in perspective, in 1992 approximately 184,000
swaps were written with a notional principal of approximately
$4.7 trillion. Yet, in the same year, more than 600 million
exchange-traded futures and options contracts were traded,
representing a face value or notional amount exceeding $140
trillion.2" The swap market is also dwarfed by comparison
to the $14.4 trillion of bonds and $10.1 trillion in equity
outstanding at the end of 1991.261 Furthermore, although
these instruments are sometimes complex, even the most
complicated swaps can be broken down into individual and
well-understood building blocks of options and forwards.
"Publicly, most dealers claim the talk of a meltdown to be
greatly overblown, partly because they believe each institution
in this business to be diligently doing the right thing by
intensely monitoring its own risks."26  It is in the self-
interest of dealers and end-users to ensure no problems
develop because a disaster would ruin dealer profitability and
almost certainly hasten new, harsh regulations. 2  The
260 See G-30 REPORT, supra note 26, at 58.
261 See id.
Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7,
1994, at 40, 42.
263 See id.
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major swap market participants possess the sophistication and
resources to manage swap risks, while most banks have
negligible holdings."'
There is, however, a concern that banks less able to
evaluate swap risks will enter the fray in the future. Since
returns on capital deployed in the derivatives business average
30-40%, and sometimes approach 100%," there is a concern
that neophytes and less sophisticated banks will become
actively involved in the swap market and will be more
concerned with being competitive than with containing risks.
This danger is mitigated, however, by the fact that
counterparties will generally deal only with well-known
intermediaries.
5.2.2. Adverse Effects of Excessive Capital Requirements
Although swap risks are real and substantial, and regulat-
ors have reason to keep a watchful eye, they must exercise
restraint. Capital adequacy requirements will not contribute
to the safety and soundness of these institutions if they are set
at inappropriate levels. To the extent that the risk-based
capital requirements are not accurately correlated with the
underlying riskiness of the assets, they will cause a number of
harmful distortions. First, inappropriate capital requirements
will induce a misallocation of capital resources within the
banking industry, as well as between bank and non-bank
commercial sectors. Second, they will induce distortions in
bank pricing and business decisions, resulting in a
misallocation of resources due to balance sheet restructuring.
Third, they may cause a global credit crunch. Fourth, they
may induce banks to increase portfolio risk or acquire the
riskiest assets within each asset classification. Last, setting
inappropriate capital requirements will drive certain business
from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector.26
Since spreads on swaps are low to begin with, an as-
sessment of capital which is too high relative to its risks has
real cost consequences for dealer banks. "In the same way
264 See Becketti, supra note 62, at 33.
265 See You'd Better Ask Murphy, supra note 27, at 51.
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that uneven regulation distorted the deposit and lending
markets, disintermediating banks in favour of money market
funds ... banks will be disintermediated from the swaps
market. Swaps will simply go where regulations are most
liberal .... ." "Spread differences among competing swap
dealers are wafer-thin, and capital adequacy costs could
disadvantage the regulated dealers. Accordingly, not only
would banks from countries not embracing the Basle Accord
have a competitive advantage, but so would unregulated
investment banks, insurance companies and other
dealers.""6 If the capacity of such non-banks is insufficient
to support the market, there will be an increase in the cost to
end-users, and certain products may simply become
unavailable.2 69 Alternatively, swaps may be driven away
from banks and onto exchanges, which would harm banks by
eliminating a source of profits and be disadvantageous for
customers by eliminating the one characteristic which was
initially responsible for the creation of the OTC swap market-
the ability to customize risk exposure. 70
Overly conservative credit calculations squander capital
and risk a credit gridlock." 1 This effect is worsened by the
fact that stock markets have sometimes been unreceptive to
banks' attempts to raise capital. Because most counterparties
will only deal with intermediaries rated A or better, and since
there is a limited quantity of such institutions, the capacity of
the swap market is limited. Increased capital requirements
may decrease that capacity, and may force parties to deal with
lesser credits-increasing the potential for problems.272
5.3 Recommendations
It is clear that bank end-users benefit from the type of
inexpensive hedging that swaps provide, and equally clear is
that banks provide a needed service (and profit accordingly) by
2' Brady, supra note 134, at 30.
28 Barry W. Taylor, Swap Risk: Public and Private Regulation in
INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1988, at 89, 98 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6832, 1988).
1 See id.
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intermediating the swap market. The challenge is to maintain
a balance between prudent regulation of swap risks, without
discouraging their use or affecting banks' ability to compete as
swap dealers. Although this is a difficult challenge, what
follows are several possible suggestions which deserve further
exploration.
5.3.1. Subject Securities Firms to Basle-Like Provisions
Although the foregoing discussion of swap risks has been
countenanced in terms of banks and Basle, securities firms
should theoretically be subject to similar capital requirements.
The risks are the same regardless of whether the swap dealer
is a bank or a securities firm, and therefore prudent regulation
and concern for the global financial system requires that both
industries have similar capital requirements. Otherwise, swap
activities will simply migrate to securities firms, and if the
capital held by them is inadequate, we are left with greater
systemic risk exposure than that with which we started.
In the past, banks and securities firms have been regulated
very differently, especially for capital purposes, because of
fundamental differences in the nature of their businesses. In
addition, the idea behind bank regulation is to prevent bank
failures and ensure a healthy banking system, while
regulation of securities firms operates with a view towards an
orderly liquidation and payment of customer claims if and
when a firm fails. Global disintermediation and the increased
integration of financial markets and services, however, have
blurred the distinction between banks and securities firms.
Securities firms now offer bank-like services, such as
checkable money market mutual funds, while banks have
increased their off-balance-sheet and fee-driven activities. To
the extent that banks and securities firms provide the same or
similar services, there is less force to the argument that they
should be regulated differently.
The international securities industry has established an
organization akin to Basle, known as the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") in order to
standardize regulations among international securities
firms."'3 Thus far, however, efforts by Basle and IOSCO to
273 See 1995 MARKET RISK SUPPLEMENT, supra note 220, at 7; see also
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coordinate capital regulations have been unsuccessful.2 7 4
Such coordination will gain an even greater importance once
Basle implements market risk capital requirements.
5.3.2. Explicit Explanation of Basle's Methodologies
Basle has not been forthright in disclosing the assumptions
and methodologies utilized in arriving at the various factor
and risk weights which have been discussed. Thus, it is
difficult to assess whether Basle's factors for potential swap
credit risk, or its factors for risk-weighting under the market
proposal, are accurate because they do not explain where these
numbers originate. If Basle were to explicitly explain the
methodology and assumptions, then input and comments from
practitioners would be more constructive and meaningful, and
would stimulate feedback and discussion on the relevant
issues.
5.3.3. Refine Basle's Treatment of Swaps
In light of the criticisms set forth above and the conse-
quences of inaccurate capital standards, I suggest that an
effort be made to refine the capital requirements for swaps. It
is essential, for example, that Basle continue to refine its
treatment of netting for potential exposure while recognizing
collateral and other credit-mitigating techniques. It is also
vital that Basle develop more realistic measures of default
probabilities.
As discussed supra Section 4.2.4., Basle's reliance on a
product-based approach rather than a factor-based approach
is inadequate. This approach results in double counting of
risks for capital purposes, and makes Basle's provisions
unaccommodating to financial innovation. An attempt to
PRICE WATERHOUSE, THE REGULATION OF MARKET RISK 3 (1984).
2"4 It should be noted that because Basle's provisions are applied on a
consolidated basis, the provisions already apply to a substantial percentage
of securities firms because in countries other than the United States it is
common for banks and securities firms to be affiliates. Further, the
European Union ("EU") has established a capital framework similar to
Basle. This European framework applies to both EU banks and securities
firms. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 273. See also Gilibert, supra
note 23, at 219.
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segment the many interacting risks which banks face into
separate components will merely result in over-regulation.
[T]he BIS Accord's reliance on legalistic solutions -
rigid, classification-based rules administered and
maintained by government regulators - is reflective of
a simpler, more static financial era. The process of
financial innovation is now far too institutionalized and
complex to be so confined. The science which started to
drive finance this past decade has, in the paradigmatic
case, outrun the art of financial regulation. 5
A factor-based approach would be more consistent with
current internal systems, would be more accurate, would be
better able to incorporate new products, and would allow
banks and regulators to analyze risks at the bank level, rather
than separating the bank book from the trading book.
Basle has finally recognized the merit of banks' proprietary
models instead of mandating complicated, yet inadequate,
tables and charts. Basle's recent models-based proposal for
dealing with market risk, however, needs to be refined to
better reflect the risks at hand. If a stringent set of
quantitative and qualitative parameters for such models is
mandated, one must question the prudence of then multiplying
the assessment produced by such models by a factor of three.
Such model-based regulation should be encouraged to ensure
that these institutions have appropriate controls to monitor
credit and market risks. In addition, Basle should work in
conjunction with these institutions to develop more accurate
methods and tables for those institutions ill-equipped to
operate their own models. While there is always the danger
that this models-based approach could lead to "capture" of the
regulators by the regulated, the set of guidelines and audit
procedures put forth by Basle should ensure that this will not
occur. Basle should also expand the models-based approach to
the calculation of credit risk capital requirements.
275 Hu, supra note 8, at 435.
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5.3.4. Noncapital Based Regulation: Market Discipline
Capital is not a panacea for swap risks, and Basle-based
corrections are but one of several possible alternatives.
Minimum capital will not ensure the stability of banks simply
because "there is no substitute for good management."
2 76
The importance of internal controls was highlighted recently
by the failure of Barings PLC, caused by billions of dollars of
unauthorized derivatives trades.7 Therefore, it is essential
for dealers to monitor their credit risk and market risk
exposures on a continuous basis, and ensure that back-office
operations are adequate. To the extent dealers utilize their
own models, it is essential to re-evaluate continually the
parameters. Supervisors must make frequent on-site
examinations for purposes of auditing bank procedures and
operations.
The problem, however, is that no supervisor can adequately
monitor all banking risks, because the risks are constantly
changing. In this regard, market discipline of banks should be
encouraged. Capital requirements are an integral part of this
market discipline, for any time a bank accesses capital
markets, it will be subject to scrutiny. Disclosure of the
accounting procedures for swaps must be improved so market
forces can operate properly. In addition, bank issuance of
subordinated debt should be encouraged because it is precisely
the holders of these instruments who are most likely to
monitor and least affected by moral hazard. Although Basle's
market risk proposal would incorporate a third tier of capital
composed of subordinated debt which could be used to satisfy
market risk capital requirements, Basle should increase the
role of such debt as satisfaction of credit risk requirements as
well.
Some have suggested that the role of market forces would
be enhanced by severing the applicability of deposit insurance
to derivatives and other bank activities."7 Although the
viability of this alternative is beyond the scope of this paper,
severance of deposit insurance from derivatives would enhance
27 Michael Blanden, No Time for Risks, THE BANKER, Jan. 1993, at 24,
24.
27 See A Tale of Two Banks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 20-21.
278 See New Rules for Banks, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1993, at 20.
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market discipline and is worth exploring. Perhaps all trading
activities could be segregated into separately capitalized, non-
insured subsidiaries.
5.3.5. Enactment of Legal Reforms
Certainty in the world of finance is a precious yet often
scarce commodity. However, in order for swaps to be ac-
curately priced and available, their legal status must be
strengthened. It is important that countries with bankruptcy
and other laws written prior to the proliferation of swaps and
other derivatives amend such laws to clarify the treatment of
swaps.
6. CONCLUSION
While derivatives have revolutionized finance, "they have
yet to revolutionize regulation."27  Responding to the
regulatory challenges that swaps present is not easy, and
achieving harmony among national systems is a particularly
difficult task. The main conflict is between providing an
accurate assessment of risk while maintaining a system which
can be readily administered and monitored. Basle should look
beyond its building-block approach and learn from the methods
that sophisticated banks use to manage their own risks."'
Basle's provisions were initially designed for simplicity, so
that less sophisticated regulators and institutions subject to
the Basle Accord could administer them."' There are real
costs, however, when regulation is unable to parallel the
sophistication of those subject to regulation, especially when
the regulations are unable to keep pace with innovation.
Regulation should not discourage risk-taking, because that
is a bank's function: to accept credit and market risks that
others are unwilling to bear for an appropriate price. It
should, however, ensure that risks are prudently managed
through the implementation of appropriate capital, examina-
tion, accounting, and reporting requirements.2 2
279 Hansell & Muehring, supra note 101, at 61.
2 8 0A Simple Proposal, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1993, at 20, 21.
281 See Hu, supra note 8, at 395.
282 See Susan M. Phillips, Derivative Markets-Challenges & Regulatory
Issues, WORLD OF BANKING, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 4, 5.
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Banks have shifted away from traditional deposit-taking
and lending, and towards trading and market-making. This
development, however, is not necessarily a cause for concern,
because such activities may benefit banks and society. Swaps
illustrate a case in point. By meeting a need not fully met by
exchange-traded products, banks, through the creation of OTC
swaps, provide a valuable service."s In the process, swaps
have enabled end-users, including banks themselves, to control
their risk exposures in very precise ways. Standard
documentation and price competition among dealers has
minimized the cost of swaps, yet swap activities still provide
profits to a once beleaguered banking industry. The benefits
of such products should not be overshadowed by the occasional
abuse by a swap dealer or the occasional imprudent use by an
end-user.
While the concerns of regulators should not be disregarded,
one should not lose sight of the benefits provided by these
instruments. Regulators will continue to walk the tightrope
separating the dangers from the opportunities, but must do so
in recognition of the fact that the transformation in the nature
of banking has been driven by market forces. Severe
regulatory restrictions, which obstruct the evolution of banks,
may instead drive banks to extinction.
28' Serge Ballanger, Regulating the Derivatives Revolution, THE BANKER'S
MAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 54, 58.
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